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INTRODUCTION 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides a framework for 
the liberalization of international trade in services. The negotiation of specific 
commitments on market access and national treatment and the development of 
disciplines on domestic regulation should lead to the progressive dismantling of 
barriers to services trade between World Trade Organization (WTO) Mem-
bers.1 
The text of GATS provisions VI on domestic regulation, XVI on market 
access and XVII on national treatment, and to a lesser extent XVIII on other 
commitments, leave ambiguity concerning their substance, scope and interac-
tion. This in turn blurs the functioning of central GATS concepts and the conse-
quences attached to inscribed commitments.2 The United States – Gambling case 
(US – Gambling)3 specifically dealt with the provision on market access and 
touched upon several issues related to the other provisions or their interaction. 
In turn this decision rekindled a lively debate in the literature, sometimes re-
flecting opposing positions regarding the understanding of these provisions. 
Using appropriate international rules of treaty interpretation, this paper 
aims to further a deeper understanding of the scope and regulation of the 
GATS rules on domestic regulation, market access and national treatment, and 
the consequences of inscribing specific commitments. 
Research performed on this topic can and has led to important insights 
which WTO Members may wish to pay heed to. Such research has clarified 
current obligations derived from article VI and the inscribed specific commit-
ments. The current services negotiations taking place within the Doha Round 
could benefit from greater clarity as well. The present uncertainty regarding 
these provisions could impact Member‘s negotiating positions as the implications 
of their commitments may be unclear. 
Moreover, correctly applying the provisions under discussion here is par-
ticularly important as they can be said to touch the heart of the GATS Agree-
ment. These provisions reflect the balance between trade liberalization on the 
one hand, and the right to domestically regulate services in order to meet na-
tional policy objectives on the other.4 
                                         
1  Preamble to the GATS, see also article XIX GATS. 
2  Mattoo 1997, p. 107-108 and 113; Ortino 2008, p. 173. 
3  Appellate Body Report on United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/AB/R, 20 April 2005. 
4  Preamble to the GATS, see also: Krajewski 2003, p. 56-60 and Wouters & Coppens 
2008, p. 208. 
Tans: The GATS Approach towards Liberalization 
 
 
6 
 
Countries are at liberty to apply their national regulatory services stan-
dards as long as these standards comply with the GATS trade norms. Interpre-
tation of these trade norms therefore affects regulatory autonomy directly.5 
The main aim of this paper is to help to provide clarity regarding the cen-
tral concepts of domestic regulation, market access and national treatment. De-
spite various publications aiming at the same goal, clarity is still lacking, not 
least because some publications adopt different approaches and conclusions. In 
working towards this central aim, the paper will address several problems. 
In the first place, the paper will demonstrate that article VI on the one hand 
and articles XVI and XVII are not mutually exclusive. Instead they should be 
seen as complementary. However, future disciplines should take a clear stance 
on this issue as non-exclusiveness or exclusiveness between these provisions has 
significant consequences. 
Secondly, the paper will argue that the seemingly diverse opinions con-
cerning the delineation between market access and domestic regulation are ac-
tually closer than an initial reading of the Gambling case and the various reac-
tions following it suggest.6 
Thirdly, the paper will address two types of problems relating to the scope 
of the provisions on market access and national treatment. The overlap in scope 
can lead to conflicting commitments. While, article XVI and XVII alone can lead 
to this problem, the application of article VI can give rise to a similar conflict 
between inscribed commitments under article XVI and XVII as well. While vari-
ous options are available to enable one commitment to prevail over the other, 
making this choice might be problematic due to existing commitments which 
have been inscribed after negotiations based on reciprocity. It is therefore all 
the more important to make this choice before the conclusion of the Doha Round 
and the inscription of new commitments. 
Finally, the paper will examine the recently argued position that article XVI 
should be interpreted to apply only to discriminatory measures.7 Though such a 
view is contrary to the generally accepted stance that the provision applies to 
both non-discriminatory and discriminatory measures, the text of the GATS it-
                                         
5  Arup 2000, p. 79. As will become apparent below, the Gambling case‘s delineation of 
the provision on domestic regulation from the provision on market access in particular has 
led to a fierce debate in the literature, precisely because the decision touches this bal-
ance. 
6  It should be emphasised that the topic of this paper moves beyond the scope of the 
Gambling case. Nevertheless, the importance of the case and the literature following it to 
the topic at hand justify its central position within this paper. 
7  To my knowledge this position has first been posed by Marchetti and Mavroidis, see: 
Marchetti & Mavroidis 2006 and Mavroidis 2007, discussed in detail in §3.4. This paper 
will discuss the arguments posed in the latter publication, thus only referring to Mavroidis. 
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self does not provide clarity. As some of the problems discussed in this paper 
would not arise if article XVI applies to discriminatory measures only, it is worth 
considering further. 
The paper is divided in three parts. Part 1 will provide the necessary back-
ground. Part 2 will provide an overview of the GATS provisions under scrutiny 
and their interaction. Part 3 contains the main substance of this paper, provid-
ing a legal analysis of the four abovementioned problems and suggesting, 
where possible, solutions. 
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PART 1 BACKGROUND 
Before dealing with the topic itself it is necessary to provide a brief overview 
of the United States - Gambling case (§1.1). The following section will identify 
the appropriate means of interpreting the GATS (§1.2). Next, an overview of 
the various sources for interpretation used in this paper and their respective 
legal value will be provided (§1.3). An extensive description of the methodolo-
gy used in interpreting these provisions is warranted. As will become apparent, 
the interpretation of the text of these GATS provisions can lead to opposing 
conclusions. This requires judicial prudence as rejecting one textual treaty inter-
pretation over another should be based on a sound fundament of interpreta-
tive sources. Due to their importance the Scheduling Guidelines will be dealt 
with in a separate paragraph (§1.4). 
1.1  The United States – Gambling case 
The US – Gambling case concerned a complaint submitted by Antigua and Bar-
buda (Antigua) against several United States‘ measures that allegedly entailed 
the impediment of cross-border supply of gambling and betting services.8 The 
small Caribbean island nation of Antigua had set up ‗a primarily Internet-
based, ―remote-access‖ gaming industry as part of its economic development 
strategy.‘9 According to Antigua this industry suffered from an increasingly ag-
gressive US strategy to impede these cross-border gaming activities.10  
The complainant argued that these measures were inconsistent with several 
GATS provisions as the US had inscribed a full commitment on cross-border 
gambling and betting services in its schedule of commitments.11 
                                         
8  Notably the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, see: US – 
Gambling Panel Report, par. 3.72. Note that the Panel states that Antigua has not made 
a prima facie demonstration that the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) is inconsistent with 
the GATS, US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.218. Nevertheless that measure did play 
a role in the dispute as the IHA was found to exempt domestic suppliers of remote gam-
bling and betting services from the other three Acts which outlaw remote supply of such 
services, US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 364 and 396. 
9  Panel Report on United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/R, 10 November 2004, par. 3.2. 
10  US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 3.5. A more extensive description of the facts and 
background of the Gambling case can be found in Krajewski 2005, p. 419-422. 
11  The US had inscribed a mode 1 commitment under market access and national treatment 
under ‗other recreational services‘, a sub-sector part of the service sector ‗recreational, 
cultural, and sporting services‘. This commitment only explicitly exempted sporting serv-
ices. While the US schedule of commitments did not contain any language on ‗gambling 
and betting services‘, the Services Sectoral Classification List (GATT (GNS) 1991a) 
→ 
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In brief the case was decided as follows. The Panel and Appellate Body 
found that the US indeed had inscribed a full market access commitment for 
cross-border gambling and betting services, in particular based on the argu-
ment that a Member‘s intention in scheduling is not conclusive as schedules 
represent a common agreement among all Members.12 
Based on reasoning discussed extensively below the US measures were 
considered to be market access restrictions as listed in article XVI:2(a) and (c) 
prohibiting the remote supply of gambling services. However, the Appellate 
Body accepted the US argumentation that the measures, with the exception of 
the Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA), were necessary to protect public morals or 
public order and thus fell under the general exemption to GATS obligations 
provided in article XIV(a) GATS.13 The IHA was found to be discriminatory con-
trary to the non-discrimination requirement contained in the chapeau of article 
XIV as the measure exempts domestic suppliers of remote gambling and bet-
ting services from the other three measures (the Wire Act, the Travel Act and 
the Illegal Gambling Business Act) which prohibit remote supply of these servic-
es.14 
1.2  Interpretative methodology 
The GATS is a multilateral agreement, included in annex 1B of the WTO 
Agreement and forms an integral part thereof.15 The Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU), providing the rules and procedures concerning WTO dis-
putes,16 indicates that customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law are to be applied to clarify provisions of WTO Agreements.17 These cus-
                                         
places ‗gambling and betting services‘ within this sub-sector. This issue is discussed in 
more detail in §1.4. 
Antigua claimed that GATS articles VI, XVI, XVII and XI (concerning the prohibition of re-
strictions of international transfers and payments) had been infringed by the US meas-
ures, US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 2.1. 
12  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 159, in detail: Krajewski 2005, p. 422-
427. 
13  The prohibition of remote gambling services is connected to the prevention of organised 
crime which uses the industry for money laundering and fraud. Moreover, the prohibition 
relates to the prevention of underage gambling and health issues, US – Gambling Panel 
Report, par. 3.15-3.19. 
14  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 354-357, 364 and 369, see also the sum-
mary contained in par. 372. See in detail: Krajewski 2005, p. 438-444. 
15  Article II:2 WTO. 
16  Article 1 DSU and annex 1. See also article XXIII GATS. 
17  Article 3:2 DSU. International agreements are normally interpreted according to custo-
mary rules of treaty interpretation; see Krajewski 2003, p. 49. 
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tomary rules of interpretation have, to an important extent,18 been codified in 
articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).19 As 
such, they are applied by the Dispute Settlement Bodies and most commenta-
tors consider them as the standard of interpretation for WTO law.20 
The GATS provisions here under scrutiny will be interpreted in accordance 
with these customary rules of interpretation. To that end, the ordinary meaning 
of the terms in these provisions will have to be examined in their context bear-
ing in mind their object and purpose.21 
                                         
18  General rules of customary international law, other than interpretation rules, apply to the 
WTO agreements as well, see: Panel Report on Korea – Measures Affecting Government 
Procurement (Korea – Procurement), WT/DS163/R, 19 June 2000, par. 7.96, see in par-
ticular: Pauwelyn 2001, p. 544. 
Moreover, article 31(c) VCLT specifically states that ‗any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties‘ are to be taken into account. Most 
commentators agree that other rules of public international law can therefore be applied 
when interpreting WTO law, Marceau 1999, p. 87; Krajewski 2003, p. 53. Note that 
the phrase ‗applicable in the relations between the parties‘ in article 31(c) presumably 
applies to relevant rules that apply between all parties to a treaty, not just to parties in 
a particular dispute, see regarding that debate: Krajewski 2003, p. 53. To this can be 
added that a view contrary would be problematic when interpreting treaty provisions 
outside the context of a particular dispute, as I am about to do here. 
Finally, it should be noted that Pauwelyn convincingly argues that, besides the specific 
reference to rules of customary international law in article 3:2 DSU (and, though implicit, 
31(c) VCLT), all general international law, including general principles of international 
law that apply between all WTO Members, applies to the WTO Agreements, Pauwelyn 
2001, p. 542-543. 
19  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded at Vienna 23 May 1969, entered 
into force on 27 January 1980, 8 ILM 679 / United Nations, Treaty Series vol. 1155, 
p. 331. The International Court of Justice ruled that the Vienna rules indeed reflect cus-
tomary international law, ICJ Territorial Dispute Libya v. Chad (Libya v Chad), 13 Febru-
ary 1994, ICJ Reports  1994, p. 4, par. 41. See also Aust 2000, p. 11. 
20  Krajewski 2003, p. 49, who is referring to inter alia: Appellate Body Report on United 
States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), WT/ 
DS2/AB/R and WT/DS4/AB/R, 20 May 1996, section III.B; Pauwelyn 2001, p. 542; 
Lennard 2002, p. 17-18. See in relation to the GATS: US – Gambling Appellate Body 
Report, par. 190 and recently Panel Report on China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights 
and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products 
(China – Publications and Audiovisual Products), WT/DS363/R, 12 August 2009, par. 
7.922. Implicitly confirmed by the Appellate Body, Appellate Body Report on China – 
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China – Publications and Audiovisual Products), 
WT/DS363/R, 21 December 2009, par. 348. 
21  Article 31 VCLT indicates that the terms of the provisions, their context and their object 
and purpose consists of the following sources: preamble and annexes; agreements relat-
ing to the treaty which were made between all the parties in connection with the conclu-
sion of the treaty; any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument re-
lated to the treaty; any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
→ 
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It is important to realise that the elements contained in article 31 VCLT are 
all part of a single rule of interpretation, no hierarchy is intended. Neverthe-
less, in practice the text itself, (commonly called the textual approach) does 
take a central position. Object and purpose are often used to confirm initial 
textual interpretations.22 
Article 32 VCLT establishes that supplementary means of interpretation, in-
cluding preparatory work and circumstances of its conclusion, are to be used to 
confirm the outcome of the initial examination as prescribed in article 31 and 
to clarify ambiguous, obscure or manifestly absurd or unreasonable results. The 
approach adopted in the VCLT places the meaning of the text above the inten-
tion of the parties without reducing the use of supplementary means, such as 
preparatory work, to an ineffective role. Rather, the system adopted intends to 
ensure that the supplementary means do not form an autonomous method of 
interpretation.23 
                                         
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its in-
terpretation; any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. Treaty terms must be given special meaning when parties intended a treaty 
term to have such special meaning. 
22  The International Law Commission states: ‗that the process of interpretation is a unity and 
that the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule.‘ International Law 
Commission 1966, at 219-220. Article 31 VCLT creates one general rule of interpreta-
tion, indicating that text, context and object and purpose are all to be equally consi-
dered. No hierarchy is intended, Aust 2000, p. 186-187. 
However as indicated by Sinclair ‗it is in any event clear that, within the framework of 
the Convention regime, consideration of the object and purpose is only one element of 
the general rule, and a subsidiary element at that‘ (emphasis added), Sinclair 1984, p. 
118. Similar: determination of ordinary meaning cannot be done in abstract, context and 
object and purpose needed as well. However, in practice object and purpose is more for 
the purpose of confirming an interpretation, thus precedence is given to the textual ap-
proach, Aust 2000, p. 188, referring to O‘Connell 1970, p. 225; Lennard 2002, p. 21-
22; Krajewski 2003, p. 50. 
In a dissenting opinion Judge Schwebel provides an excellent overview, indicating that 
all elements of the rule are poised towards retrieving the intention of the parties. The 
text is presumed to be an authentic expression (hence the practical starting point of in-
terpretation) whereas evidence of the intentions of parties besides the text can repair 
situations where the outcome of the textual interpretation is not viable or unclear, ICJ 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Ba-
hrain), 15 February 1995, dissenting opinion of Vice-President Schwebel, ICJ Reports 
1995, p. 25-37. 
Note that the Dispute Settlement Bodies have been criticized for failing to embrace a ho-
listic approach which considers all the relevant elements suggested in article 31:1 VCLT, 
see Ortino 2006, p. 117 and Irwin & Weiler 2008, p. 90-95. 
23  Sinclair 1984, p. 115-116; Aust 2000, p. 185-187; Lennard 2002, p. 22; Ortino 2006, 
p. 130-132 and fn 46. 
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The method of interpretation used within this paper will take the text of 
provisions as a starting point. As various different sources will be used to con-
firm initial conclusions or to clarify ambiguous results it may be helpful to classi-
fy all sources used throughout this paper in the beginning. The classification 
exercise below will prevent sources from being used in a manner other than the 
VCLT prescribes. 
Opinions of various commentators will be examined as well to indicate and 
clarify possible issues or interpretative problems left unclear. Finally, conclu-
sions will be drawn indicating remaining issues and where possible suggesting 
solutions. 
1.3  Classification of sources according to the VCLT 
The text of the GATS includes the preamble of the Agreement and all annexes. 
Note that the schedules of commitments are annexed to the Agreement and 
form an integral part of the GATS.24 
In accordance with article 31(2)(a) VCLT, the context of the GATS includes 
all Agreements and instruments contained in the final act of the Uruguay Round. 
In particular this paper will refer to the GATT as a means of interpretation by 
analogy, as parts of the GATS have been modelled on the GATT. Besides the 
reference to customary rules of interpretation, the WTO Agreement states in 
article XVI:1 that: ‗the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and 
customary practices followed by the contracting parties to GATT 1947 and the 
bodies established in the framework of GATT 1947‘. Therefore the adopted 
language includes the interpretation of those provisions in earlier case-law 
since the creation of the GATT in 1947. GATS articles containing old GATT con-
cepts and similar language to GATT provisions therefore allows for analogous 
interpretation.25 
                                         
24  Article XX:3 GATS, as confirmed by the Dispute Settlement Bodies in relation to the 
GATT in Appellate Body Report on E.C. – Customs Classification of Certain Computer 
Equipment (EC – Computer Equipment), WT/DS62/AB/R, 22 June 1998, par. 109 and 
analogously applied to the GATS in US – Gambling Panel Report par. 6.44, Appellate 
Body Report par. 159, see also Krajewski 2005, p. 422. 
25  See Jackson 1998, p. 14; Al-Kashif 2008, p. 510; Krajewski 2003, p. 52; Ortino 2008, 
p. 176. The analogous interpretation approach was confirmed for WTO agreements in 
Appellate Body Report on US - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998 (US – 
Section 211 Appropriations Act), WT/DS176/AB/R, 2 January 2002, par. 242 and 
Panel Report on EC – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products), WT/DS291/R, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS293/R, 21 November 2006, par. 7.2401-7.2406 and specifically for the GATS 
based on GATT provisions in Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Regime 
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), WT/DS27/AB/R, 
25 September 1997, par. 229-232. As noted by Krajewski, although not expressly indi-
→ 
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Adopted Panel reports and Appellate Body conclusions are only legally 
binding with respect to resolving the particular dispute between the parties to 
that dispute. However, previously adopted Panel reports should still be taken 
into account when they are relevant in a dispute.26 Regarding Appellate Body 
conclusions, the Appellate Body has ruled that: ‗following the Appellate Body‘s 
conclusions in earlier disputes is not only appropriate, [i]t is what would be ex-
pected from Panels, especially where the issues are the same.‘27 
In the US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) case the Panel explicitly rejected earli-
er Appellate Body conclusions in its report.28 On appeal the Appellate Body 
stated, in no uncertain terms, that this practice undermines the development of 
a coherent and predictable WTO acquis. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body, 
although specifically asked to do so by the European Community (EC), did not 
rule that a Panel is obliged to follow earlier Appellate Body conclusions.29 
Concluding, earlier case-law is particularly relevant when interpreting 
WTO provisions as such rulings are part of the WTO acquis. While rulings are 
non-binding and interpretative lines in case-law can and have changed, case-
law interpretations form authoritative legal interpretations which WTO judges 
should follow absent compelling reasons.30 
It should be noted that academic studies play a different role than judge 
made case-law. A particular function of such studies is to analyse and when 
necessary critique the findings of such case-law. Therefore, this paper will ap-
ply WTO case-law retaining the possibility to criticize. 
                                         
cated, this method of interpretation can be seen as based on the context of the GATS as 
prescribed in article 31(2) VCLT, Krajewski 2003, p. 52. Some reference will also be 
made to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). 
26  Appellate Body Report on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beve-
rages II), WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 1 November 1996, p. 14. 
The Appellate Body rejected the Panel conclusion that adopted reports are subsequent 
practice included in article 31 VCLT, Panel Report on Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beve-
rages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), WT/DS8/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, 11 July 
1996, par. 6.10. See also article 3:2 DSU and Al-Kashif 2008, p. 543-544. 
27  Appellate Body Report on United States – Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Re-
views), WT/DS268/AB/R, 11 May 2007, par. 188. See also Appellate Body Report on 
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Ar-
ticle 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia (US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia)), WT/DS58/ 
AB/RW, 22 October 2001, par. 108-109 where the Appellate Body extended the rea-
soning adopted in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II to Appellate Body conclusions. 
28  Panel Report on US – Final Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US – 
Stainless Steel (Mexico)), WT/DS344/R, 20 December 2007, par. 7.106. 
29  Appellate Body Report on US – Stainless Steel (Mexico), WT/DS344/AB/R, 20 May 
2008, par. 146 and 158-162, see regarding the EC request, par. 149. 
30  See also US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, par. 160. 
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Article 31(2)(b) VCLT indicates that instruments made by one or more par-
ties in connexion with the conclusion of the GATS and accepted by all parties 
are also part of the context. Protocols and ministerial decisions taken at Mar-
rakech Conference should be seen as belonging to this category.31 
Subsequent agreement and practice, as referred to in article 31(3)(a) and 
(b) VCLT, includes the additional protocols to the GATS resulting from post 
Uruguay Round negotiations. Subsequent practice also includes decisions of 
relevant WTO bodies and relevant parts of ministerial declarations.32 
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT refers to relevant rules of international law applica-
ble between the parties. As explained, most commentators agree that this al-
lows interpreting with reference to other rules of public international law that 
apply between the Members.33 
As is clear from article 31 VCLT, the object and purpose of the GATS are 
part of the initial means of interpretation.34 For the purpose of the provisions 
under scrutiny in this paper it is enough to refer to the preambular paragraphs 
on liberalization and the expansion of trade in services and the right of Mem-
bers to regulate. It is important to keep these potentially conflicting objectives 
in mind while interpreting GATS provisions, in particular those relating to do-
mestic regulation, market access and national treatment.35 
Article 32 identifies preparatory work and the circumstances of its conclu-
sion as supplementary means of interpretation. The most important sources to 
be considered as supplementary means are the Scheduling Guidelines (Guide-
lines) which will be discussed separately in §1.4. 
As is apparent from the text of article 32 VCLT, the supplementary means 
of interpretation are not limited to a specific list of sources. As such generally 
accepted other methods are: logic, good sense, effective interpretation and the 
principle of in dubio mitius.36 
                                         
31  Krajewski 2003, p. 51. 
32  Krajewski 2003, p. 52. 
33  Above n 18. 
34  Above n 22. 
35  See for a more thorough description of GATS interpretation and the object and purpose 
of the Agreement Krajewski 2003, p. 56-57. As noted by Krajewski, the Appellate Body 
is extremely reluctant to refer to the object and purpose of WTO agreements, though it 
does refer to the object and purpose of specific provisions. I agree with Krajewski that 
this judicial self-restraint is not suitable for an academic study interpreting specific provi-
sions. The object and purpose of the GATS reveals a conflict of objectives underlying the 
GATS which must be kept in mind when interpreting GATS provisions. 
36  The principle of effective interpretation entails that effect is given to the meaning that 
most effectively supports the objectives of the parties to the treaty. The principle of in 
dubio mitius entails that effect is given to the meaning that is least restrictive on a State‘s 
sovereignty, confirmed by the Appellate Body as a principle to be used in WTO law in-
→ 
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Although not legally binding, the rulings of the Panel and the Appellate 
Body in the Gambling case address several aspects of these provisions. These 
rulings will be discussed extensively. Moreover, the Gambling case has rekin-
dled a lively debate regarding articles VI, XVI and XVII GATS which has led to 
useful insights which will be examined as well. 
Finally, there are numerous documents created by various organs of the 
WTO, such as secretariat notes, notes provided by the chairs of specific nego-
tiation groups, notes of meetings and accounts of discussions in relevant working 
groups. These notes are not legally binding, yet they often provide useful in-
sight, not least as indicating those issues that are not unambiguous. As such they 
will be used similarly as opinions in the literature. 
1.4  The Scheduling Guidelines 
The Scheduling Guidelines are used in the Gambling case and in the literature 
to support many arguments, yet until recently their legal and interpretative sta-
tus was unclear. Moreover, the discussion reflected in the last part of this paper 
revolves in part around the legal status of the Scheduling Guidelines. There-
fore, it is necessary to specifically and extensively address this interpretative 
source. 
During the Uruguay Round, the Group of Negotiating on Services created 
a document, known as the Scheduling Guidelines 1993, suggesting a common 
approach in scheduling in order to ensure that Member‘s schedules of commit-
ments remain comparable and unambiguous.37 
This document has been revised, resulting in the Scheduling Guidelines 
2001.38 As the 2001 Guidelines apply from the moment of their adoption all 
schedules drafted prior to 23 March 2001 have been drafted according to the 
1993 Guidelines.39 The 2001 Guidelines are mostly a reproduction of the 
1993 Guidelines with a few added provisions not leading to substantive 
                                         
terpretation in European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) (EC - Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, 13 February 1998, par. 165, see Kra-
jewski 2003, p. 50. See also: Mavroidis 2007, p. 11. 
37  GATT (GNS) 1993a, par. 1. See also addendum 1 to the Scheduling Guidelines: GATT 
(GNS) 1993b providing answers to several questions submitted by delegations relating 
to scheduling commitments. For clarity hereinafter referred to as: Scheduling Guidelines 
1993 and Scheduling Guidelines 1993, addendum 1. 
38  WTO (CTS) 2001a, for clarity hereinafter referred to as: Scheduling Guidelines 2001. 
39  Scheduling Guidelines 2001, footnote 1. For this reason, the Panel and the Appellate 
Body in the US – Gambling case refer to the 1993 Guidelines. As the Appellate Body 
explains, the 2001 Guidelines are to the current negotiations what the 1993 Guidelines 
were to the Uruguay Round negotiations, US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 
190 fn 236. 
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changes.40 To simplify matters, I will refer to 1993 version only, unless specifi-
cally indicated otherwise.41 
The Guidelines provide information regarding the manner in which Mem-
bers should schedule their commitments, a matter on which the GATS itself is 
relatively brief.42 Moreover, several interpretations of GATS provisions, in par-
ticular regarding articles VI, XVI, XVII and XX, are included in the Guidelines to 
facilitate the interpretation of a Member‘s scheduled commitments. 
The Scheduling Guidelines are non-binding.43 Opinions have often differed 
regarding the exact status of the Guidelines and their place within the VCLT as 
a means of interpreting the GATS and the schedules of specific commitments.44 
The Panel in US – Gambling believed the Scheduling Guidelines were to be 
seen as relevant context, thus falling under article 31(2) (a) or (b) VCLT.45 
                                         
40  As indicated by the Appellate Body there are some minor additions, US – Gambling 
Appellate Body Report, par. 190, fn 236. For example, paragraph 8 of the 2001 
Guidelines corresponds to paragraph 4 of the 1993 Guidelines yet adds a clarifying 
sentence. However, the substance of the paragraph is unaltered by this addition. See al-
so Mavroidis 2007, p. 5. Note that some annexes and an illustrative list of limitations to 
national treatment have been added. 
41  As existing commitments are based on the 1993 Guidelines, it is submitted that, as no 
substantive changes were made, citing either the 1993 or 2001 version should not make 
a difference except when referring to the attachments made to the 2001 version. 
42  A brief amount of information can be found in articles XVI, XVII, XVIII and XX GATS. 
43  The Guidelines do not provide a legal interpretation of the GATS, Scheduling Guidelines 
1993, par. 1. As the name suggests, they are intended as guidelines, Krajewski 2003, 
p. 76. 
44  Prior to the circulation of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in the Gambling case, 
Krajewski refers to the Scheduling Guidelines 2001 as subsequent practice of WTO 
Members according to article 31(3) (b) of the VCLT, Krajewski 2003, p. 77. 
Mavroidis implies that the Panel in Mexico – Telecoms considered the Scheduling Guide-
lines as an integral part of the Travaux Préparatoires, which would classify them under 
article 32 VCLT, Mavroidis 2007, p. 7. However, I do not agree with this reading for two 
reasons. First, while the Panel relies on two documents attached to the Scheduling Guide-
lines 2001, a Note by the Chairman attached to the Notes for Scheduling Basic Tele-
communications Services Commitments, WTO (NGBT) 1997 and the Draft Model Sche-
dule of Commitments on Basic Telecommunications, WTO (NGBT) 1995, it is not the legal 
status of the Scheduling Guidelines 2001 that is addressed by the Panel; it is the two at-
tached documents that are considered to be an integral part of the Travaux Prépara-
toires. The Panel did not express an opinion on the interpretative value of the Scheduling 
Guidelines themselves: ‗We accept that the footnote means that the attachment of the 
Draft Model Schedule and the Note by the Chairman to the Scheduling Guidelines should 
not in itself affect the existing interpretative status of the two documents.‘ Second, the 
Panel does not provide a definitive answer to the question whether these documents 
should be considered under article 32 of the VCLT. It only states that even if the docu-
ments should not be assessed under article 31, they still could be treated as an important 
part of the ‗circumstances of its conclusion‘ within the meaning of article 32 VCLT, Panel 
Report on Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico – Telecoms), 
WT/DS204/R, 1 June 2004, par. 7.67. (Emphasis added). 
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However, on appeal the Appellate Body rejected the view that the Scheduling 
Guidelines should be considered as an instrument of treaty interpretation under 
article 31 VCLT.46 Furthermore, the Appellate Body concluded that the Schedul-
ing Guidelines 2001 cannot be considered as subsequent practice of the 1993 
Guidelines under article 31(3) (b) VCLT. As they were adopted in the context 
of future commitments (i.e. those inscribed during the Doha Round), they cannot 
constitute evidence regarding existing commitments (i.e. those inscribed during 
the Uruguay Round).47 Instead both documents are treated by the Appellate 
Body as preparatory work for their respective negotiating rounds and thus 
they form supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of article 
32 VCLT for those rounds.48 
The Appellate Body‘s classification of the Guidelines as preparatory work 
under article 32 VCLT is not without its critics. The underlying issue in the as-
sessment of the Scheduling Guidelines in US – Gambling was whether the Unit-
ed States‘ commitment could be interpreted by applying the Services Sectoral 
Classification List (which is based on the United Nations‘ Provisional Central 
Product Classification and often referred to as the ‗W/120 list‘), as suggested 
by the Guidelines.49 As noted by Ortino, the Appellate Body recognised that 
the negotiating history recorded: ‗confirmation of the agreement to base the 
classification of services sectors and sub-sectors as much as possible on the Cen-
tral Product Classification (CPC) list.‘50 According to Ortino, it is thus unclear 
why the Appellate Body in the Gambling case did not consider the Guidelines 
to ‗constitute evidence of an underlying, albeit more limited in scope, consensus 
among parties that had emerged during the negotiations‘, i.e. evidence of sub-
                                         
45  US – Gambling Panel Report par. 6.86 and 6.94, and rejecting an interpretation that 
would consider the Guidelines as preparatory work in the sense of article 32 VCLT, par. 
6.95. 
46  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 174-178 and 190-195. 
47  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 190-195. Moreover, the Council for Trade 
in Services Decision adopting the 2001 Guidelines specifically states that they are non-
binding and shall not modify any rights or obligations of the Members under the GATS: 
WTO (CTS) 2001c, par. 1-3. See also Mavroidis 2007, p. 5. As such, the non-binding 
status of the Guidelines is repeated in the revised edition, Scheduling Guidelines 2001, 
par. 1. 
48  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 196-197. 
49  Scheduling Guidelines 1993, par. 16, Services Sectoral Classification List: GATT (GNS) 
1991a, see Ortino 2006, p. 125. This W/120 list is based on the United Nations‘ Provi-
sional Central Product Classification which creates a detailed categorization of both 
goods and services. The W/120 list simply copies the services categorization of that list. 
50  Ortino 2006, p. 128. GATT (GNS) 1991b, par. 18, referred to in US – Gambling Appel-
late Body Report, par. 176 fn 210.  
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sequent agreement under article 31 VCLT rather than preparatory work under 
article 32. 
According to Ortino, not accepting the Scheduling Guidelines as relevant 
context under article 31 is based on a view that the document should be consi-
dered in its entirety only. On this view, the fact that parts of the document do 
not reflect general agreement amongst Members precludes its use as evidence 
of subsequent agreement. However, Ortino takes the view, and I concur, that 
when interpreting GATS provisions and schedules of commitments nothing pre-
vents those parts of the Guidelines that do enjoy wide acceptance among 
Members being considered as evidence of subsequent agreement under article 
31.51 
From a practical perspective, the Guidelines are followed by most Mem-
bers when scheduling their commitments leaving them significant in understand-
ing the schedules.52 Moreover, the Appellate Body uses the rest of a Member‘s 
schedule and schedules of other Members as context for a particular commit-
ment.53 As noted by Krajewski, the combination of these two facts leads to the 
conclusion that Members wishing to deviate from the CPC list should do so ex-
plicitly. 
In the China – Distribution Services case the Panel confirmed the approach 
adopted in US – Gambling. Initial conclusions performed on the basis of article 
31 VCLT regarding a Member‘s inscribed commitment are specifically con-
firmed by comparing the commitment with the CPC list and the W/120 list in 
                                         
51  Ortino warns that the Appellate Body‘s approach to the interpretation method in article 
31 VCLT and the resulting use of article 32 VCLT ignores that the latter provision should 
only be relied upon if the examination resulting from article 31 leads to ambiguous or 
obscure results. Article 32 should not be employed as a standalone solution precisely be-
cause its use would be applied to a ‗difficult‘ treaty text (since the application of article 
31 VCLT did not provide a satisfying result). Recourse to article 32 forms a discretionary 
step, which is signified by the phrase: ‗[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation‘ in article 32 VCLT. See for a full explanation of this critique on the Appel-
late Body‘s approach, Ortino 2006, p. 125-132. 
52  See for a similar argument based on the schedules of commitments, Mattoo 1997, p. 110 
fn 6, p. 115 and 117. He states that if scheduling practice by Members was based on a 
certain view that this gives an interpretation according to that view ‗a certain credence‘. 
This argument applies to the Guidelines as well as many Members have scheduled ac-
cording to its suggestions. It is important to realise that the schedules of specific commit-
ments form an integral part of the GATS, see article XX:3 GATS. Therefore, schedules 
might be drafted unilateral but they are interpreted as agreement among all Members, 
see US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.44 and Appellate Body Report, par. 159, see 
also Krajewski 2005, p. 422-423. 
53  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 178. 
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the light of the rest of a Member‘s schedule and the schedules of other Mem-
bers.54 
To conclude, the Scheduling Guidelines should be seen as supplementary 
means of interpretation within the meaning of article 32 VCLT, the 1993 
Guidelines regarding the Uruguay Round negotiations and the 2001 Guide-
lines for the current negotiations. Furthermore, it is sensible to regard the CPC 
list and the W/120 document as a source of evidence regarding a Member‘s 
commitments. As these documents are non-binding, Members have the possibili-
ty to specifically deviate from that list, however, this should be done explicitly. 
 
 
                                         
54  China – Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report, par. 7.923. The Panel adopts 
a very careful and thorough approach based on the Vienna Convention towards analys-
ing specific commitments, perhaps in response to the critique following the Gambling 
case. See for instance: China – Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report, par. 
7.943-7.954 and in particular the 66 paragraphs concerning China‘s commitment on 
‗sound recording distribution services‘: par. 7.1182-7.1247. The Panel decision has been 
appealed by China: China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, Notification of an 
Appeal by China, WT/DS363/10, 22 September 2009. 
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PART 2 THE GATS APPROACH TO LIBERALIZATION 
Before turning to the substance of this paper it is essential to provide an analy-
sis of the GATS approach towards liberalization. After a brief introduction 
(§2.1) and a description of the GATT approach for comparison (§2.2), the 
GATS structure towards liberalization will be described (§2.3). The next section 
will emphasize the importance of upholding the adopted structure by classify-
ing measures according to their appropriate GATS provision (§2.4). Finally, the 
specific provisions that, combined with Members‘ schedules of commitments, 
provide the regulatory framework towards liberalization adopted in the GATS 
will be analysed separately (§2.5). 
The analysis provided in part 2 will be used when examining the more 
problematic aspects of these provisions in part 3. As such part two contains the 
generally accepted approaches and interpretations regarding these provisions 
which will be used to provide a base for approaches and interpretations which 
are still under discussion in the literature. Suggestions for solutions to the indi-
cated problems in part 3 will be included where possible. 
2.1  Introduction 
Liberalizing international trade in services takes a different form than the tra-
ditional approach adopted to liberalize trade in goods. Due to the characteris-
tics of services and the fact that proximity of supplier and consumer is often 
required, international trade in services often does not cross borders in the 
same way as trade in goods does. Therefore international trade in services 
cannot effectively be controlled at physical borders.55 The consequence of this 
is that barriers to trade in services take a different form than traditional bor-
der measures such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions. 
                                         
55  As explained by Karsenty, cross-border trade, or mode 1, is similar to trade in goods if 
the service can be embodied in a transportable medium, Karsenty 2000, p. 35-36. The 
nature of services, and the delineation between goods and services  tends to shift due to 
technical and structural change, a process which is described by Bhagwati as ‗the splin-
tering of goods from services and services from goods‘ and the ‗disembodiment of ser-
vices‘, see Bhagwati 1984, p. 134-138. 
Djordjevic explains that cross-border trade in services does not entail the transfer of a 
service across a border but rather the result of the service performed, Djordjevic 2002, 
p. 306, referring to Karsenty  2000, p. 41: ‗The consumer, although being abroad, re-
mains a resident of its home country, thus giving rise to transactions between residents 
and nonresidents. The result is an import of services for the country of the consumer and 
an export for the supplying country.‘ Services supplied through commercial presence, 
mode 3, or the presence of natural persons, mode 4, are equally ‗undetectable‘ at the 
border as these services are produced and consumed within the host state. 
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While such barriers can be used for protectionist aims, normally the inten-
tion is not to restrict trade in services as such. Instead, these barriers may often 
take the form of justifiable regulatory measures or other policy instruments, as 
a side effect, restrict trade in services. For example, measures aimed at im-
proving the quality or efficient supply of services or the capability of the pro-
vider. Some forms of regulation do not address a particular service at all, yet 
nevertheless forms a barrier that affects trade in that service.56 
Government measures affecting services trade appear in many forms. In 
the first place, the concept of services itself includes a wide range of different 
activities and can, from a GATS perspective, be supplied through four different 
modes.57 As there are currently 153 WTO Members with differing political, 
social and economic systems and numerous regulatory methods, the degree of 
regulatory variation is high indeed.58 
Moreover, services sectors tend to be heavily regulated. The GATS does 
not aim to remove such regulations, as is evident from its recognition of a 
Member‘s right to regulate services. Rather, the focus of the agreement is on 
the removal of ineffective or unnecessary regulations and disguised forms of 
protectionism.59 
2.2  Comparison with the GATT structure 
As the GATS mechanism of liberalization is partly modelled on the GATT, it is 
useful to briefly explore the GATT structure, which contains several provisions 
that might be viewed as the counterparts of the GATS provisions here under 
discussion.60 
                                         
56  See for a brief explanation, including the problem of assessing trade effects of domestic 
regulation, Delimatsis 2006b, p. 16-17. 
57  Article 1:2 GATS, the international provision of services is defined by referring to four 
possible modes of supply: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial pres-
ence and the movement of natural persons. 
58  Cape Verde was the last member to join on 23 July 2008, see the website of the WTO 
<www.wto.org>. Krajewski 2003, p. 39. Krajewski has created a useful general over-
view of economic and political motivations for regulation as well as a description of 
common instruments of regulation and regulatory policies. From this overview Krajewski 
distils a typology of regulatory measures based on the degree of intervention or restric-
tion of economic behaviour. This typology consists of three categories from least to high-
est interventionist: economic incentives, behavioural controls and restrictions of activities. 
Krajewski‘s categorisation is useful when dealing with the notions of ‗necessity‘ and ‗least-
restrictiveness‘ in WTO law, see Krajewski 2003, chapter 2. See also OECD 2001. 
59  Matsushita et al 2006, p. 604; Van den Bossche & Denters 2007, p. 646. 
60  See for a more thorough explanation regarding the purpose of these GATS provisions 
and their GATT counterparts: Pauwelyn 2005, p. 133-139 and Irwin & Weiler 2008, 
p. 99-101. See also Mattoo 1997, p. 112-113. See §1.3 regarding the use of GATT 
provisions for analogous interpretation. 
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The GATT structure applying to trade in goods differentiates between two 
types of measures. Custom duties and quantitative restrictions are applied at a 
Member‘s borders and are referred to as border measures or market access 
restrictions. Regulations that apply within a Member‘s territory, such as safety 
standards or internal taxation, are referred to as domestic regulation or inter-
nal measures.61 
As market access restrictions only target the import of goods, and therefore 
do not affect domestic products, the presumption is that these measures are 
aimed at protectionism. The GATT aims at the reduction of such restrictions and 
therefore market access restrictions are in principle prohibited.62 
The GATT approach to domestic regulation is different. By targeting both 
foreign and domestic products, non-discriminatory domestic regulations pre-
sumably have a non-protectionist aim and as such fall within the sovereign right 
of Members to regulate. Such measures are therefore in principle allowed. Fol-
lowing the same rationale, discriminatory domestic regulation, when disfavour-
ing the import of goods, is in principle prohibited.63 
As indicated by Pauwelyn, there are both economic and political argu-
ments for the distinction adopted within the GATT. Protectionist measures are, in 
general, economically wasteful both for foreign producers and domestic con-
sumers. From a political perspective, protectionism usually serves an economic 
interest only. In contrast, domestic regulation normally addresses various legiti-
mate objectives such as safety for consumers, quality of products and environ-
mental protection.64 
The original GATT regime on domestic regulation was altered in 1995 with 
the adoption of the WTO Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). These agreements impose certain 
conditions on non-discriminatory domestic regulations.65 
                                         
61  Article II GATT addresses market access restrictions in the form of custom duties and ‗oth-
er duties or charges imposed on or in connection with importation‘. Article XI GATT ad-
dresses quantitative import prohibitions or restrictions. Article III GATT addresses domes-
tic regulation, thus measures which apply to foreign and domestic products. 
62  Article II GATT states that a Member cannot impose tariffs higher than a country‘s sche-
dule which contains that country‘s concessions on the bindings of tariffs. Article XI GATT 
contains a general prohibition on quantitative restrictions. 
‗In principle‘ as the GATT contains several justification provisions, Mattoo 1997, p. 112 
and Pauwelyn 2005, p. 134. 
63  Article III GATT contains the national treatment obligation, note that the GATT does not 
address discriminatory treatment in favour of imported products. See also: Pauwelyn 
2005, p. 134. 
64  Pauwelyn 2005, p. 134-135. 
65  Examples of these conditions are the requirement that such measures should not be more 
trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil certain objectives, such as the protection of hu-
→ 
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2.3  The GATS structure 
While different views exist as to whether a similar regime for market access 
restrictions and domestic regulation is adopted in the GATS, a similar rationale 
can be discerned in its provisions.66 
The structure of the GATS differentiates between measures that limit mar-
ket access for foreign services and service suppliers and measures that are 
aimed at public policy objectives.67 This distinction is incorporated through ar-
ticles XVI and XVII on the one hand, and article VI on the other. Market access 
restrictions contained in article XVI GATS are quantitative in nature and in prin-
ciple prohibited, as are discriminatory regulations on the basis of article XVII 
GATS.68 
It should be stressed that articles XVI and XVII strive towards market access 
and national treatment but do not generally impose these obligations. Market 
access and national treatment apply only insofar as Members have specifically 
undertaken commitments in their schedules of commitments.69 
                                         
man health (5:6 SPS and 2:2 TBT), see: Pauwelyn 2005, p. 135. See also: Irwin & Weiler 
2008, p. 101. 
66  Mattoo states that the delineation of disciplines in GATS runs between quantitative 
measures and discriminatory measures. He indicates that the distinction in the GATS ‗does 
not correspond in any neat way to GATT distinctions‘. While that is certainly true when 
comparing articles XVI and XVII GATS to their GATT counterparts, in my opinion the ap-
proach adopted by Pauwelyn, who includes article VI in the comparison, provides a bet-
ter view on the general approach of both agreements. Pauwelyn indicates that the divid-
ing line in the GATS, as in the GATT, runs between market access restrictions on the one 
hand and domestic regulation on the other, see Mattoo 1997, p. 113 and Pauwelyn 
2005, p. 135-136. Ortino, albeit less explicitly, adopts the same approach, Ortino 
2006, p. 140 fn 75. Note however that this general comparison of the rationale behind 
the divisions adopted in GATT and GATS provisions is forced, mainly due to the differ-
ence between international trade in goods and trade in services (and therefore the dif-
ferences between regulatory barriers restricting such trade). The comparison certainly 
does not apply to the specific provisions as such, as both Mattoo and Pauwelyn indicate: 
Mattoo 1997, p. 113 fn 14 and Pauwelyn 2005, p. 134 fn 9. Similar: Delimatsis 2006a, 
p. 1063 fn 20. Compare for example the general prohibition on quantitative restrictions 
in GATT article XI and the ‗mere‘ requirement to schedule limitations under GATS article 
XVI. 
67  Low & Mattoo 2000, p. 455. 
68  Pauwelyn 2005, p. 136-137. This is ‗in principle‘ because, like the GATT, the GATS pro-
hibitions are not absolute due to justification provisions. Measures violating general obli-
gations and specific commitments can be justified based on the economic emergency ex-
ception (article X), threats to the balance of payments (article XII), general exceptions 
(article XIV) or security exceptions (article XIV bis). 
69  The provisions on market access and national treatment only apply to specific sectors 
and modes of supply depending on a Member‘s inscribed commitments. This approach is 
referred to as a positive list approach and links market access and national treatment to 
→ 
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Similar to the GATT structure, non-discriminatory domestic regulations are 
presumed to address the quality of services and the qualifications of service 
providers and therefore are in principle allowed.70 However, article VI GATS 
targets unnecessary impediments to international trade caused by such non-
discriminatory domestic regulations, as do the SPS and TBT agreements re-
garding trade in goods. As it is impossible to categorically classify regulatory 
interventions as either restricting trade or not restricting trade, article VI re-
quires the measure in question to be the least-trade restrictive.71 
It is important to realise that this least-trade restrictive regime regarding 
domestic regulation has not yet been implemented but rather is still the subject 
of negotiations. In the meantime, article VI:5 establishes several provisional 
conditions which apply to licensing and qualification requirements and technical 
standards.72 
Incorporating this regime proved troublesome when drafting the GATS. 
One reason is that trade in services is ill-suited for regulation at the border,73 
for example, because such trade often takes place intra-territorially.74 Barriers 
to trade in services are therefore more often caused by domestic regulatory 
measures. Moreover, even regulation that does not address trade in services as 
                                         
progressive liberalization: Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1060; Wouters & Coppens 2008, 
p. 212-213. See also: US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.310. 
70  Pauwelyn 2005, p. 136. 
71  Low & Mattoo 2000, p. 455. See for an explanation of the aim of article VI GATS in 
particular: Delimatsis 2006b, p. 17-18. This division between articles VI, XVI and XVII is 
often referred to as a three-pronged approach. Articles XVI and XVII target market 
access restrictions and discriminatory measures while article VI complements this ap-
proach towards effective access to services markets by targeting unnecessary non-
discriminatory domestic regulation, see for example Feketekuty 2000, p. 101 referring 
to the approach as a ‗three-legged stool‘. It should be made clear that I do not believe 
that the text of article VI excludes discriminatory measures from its scope, a matter dis-
cussed in detail at §3.1.1. 
72  As indicated by Nicolaïdis & Trachtman, the negotiating parties could at the time not 
agree on blanket restrictions on their national regulatory sovereignty, Nicolaïdis & Trach-
tman 2000, p. 258-259.It is possible that the future regime will take the form of a ne-
cessity test, see Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 246-254. 
73  Services often cannot be controlled at the border or would require a costly and burden-
some policing system, see: Matsushita et al 2006, p. 604-605. The invisible character of 
services (Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 207), the intangible nature of services (Pauwelyn 
2005, p. 135), the intangible and personal nature (Ortino 2006, p. 140 fn 75) and the 
requirement of proximity between supplier and consumer (Djordjevic 2002, p. 306) are 
cited as explanations for the difficulty of controlling trade in services through border 
measures. Thus this difficulty is directly related to the nature of services provision. These 
often used characteristics differentiating services from goods have been summarized by 
Levitt 1983, p. 92-102 and Bhagwati 1984, p. 135-136. 
74  Matsushita et al 2006, p. 604. 
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such can form a barrier to trade.75 Finally, the service sector tends to be heavi-
ly regulated to begin with.76 All these factors lead to a large number and 
widely varying range of regulatory barriers restricting trade in services, com-
plicating attempts to liberalize service markets.77 
Therefore, the helpful presumptions available when dealing with trade in 
goods (i.e. that border measures are presumed protectionist and non-discrimi-
natory domestic regulations are presumed non-protectionist), are less useful in 
the context of trade in services.78 The GATS distinction between market access 
and domestic regulation is thus not based on whether a measure is applied at 
the border.79 
As often indicated, the GATS provisions have to strike a delicate balance 
between the preservation of legitimate trade regulation falling within the sove-
reign right of Members to regulate on the one hand, and trade liberalization 
and the abolishing of protectionist and unnecessary barriers to trade in services 
on the other.80 The interaction between articles VI, XVI and XVII can best be 
understood against this background. The provisions try to regulate the reduc-
tion of barriers to trade in services derived from market access restrictions, dis-
criminatory regulation and unnecessary restrictive non-discriminatory domestic 
regulation. 
2.4  Importance of applying the right provision 
The GATS provisions VI, XVI and XVII differ in restrictive nature and scope. Ar-
ticle XVI provides a per se prohibition, in principle none of the measures listed 
in article XVI:2 may be applied. In contrast, article XVII and VI provide norma-
tive criteria to be followed when enacting regulation – as long as the criteria 
listed in those provisions are fulfilled they are lawful from a GATS perspec-
                                         
75  Delimatsis 2006b, p. 15; Krajewski 2003, p. xviii. See for a useful overview of measures 
affecting trade in services OECD 2001 and Krajewski 2003, p. 21-39, see earlier: n 58. 
76  Matsushita et al indicate asymmetry of information, negative external influences and 
concentration of power among dominant players as often listed grounds in the literature 
for such regulation, Matsushita et al 2006, p. 604. 
77  Matsushita et al 2006, p. 605. 
78  Similar: Delimatsis 2006b, p. 17 and Ortino 2006, p. 140 fn 75. 
79  Types of measures to which market access applies in the context of trade in goods, ta-
riffs, quantitative restrictions and other border measures, are not readily available in the 
services context. As Lang states, the list of market access restrictions included in article 
XVI:2 GATS is roughly analogous to these border measures traditionally applied in rela-
tion to trade in goods, Lang 2009, p. 160. 
80  See for example: Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 207; Delimatsis 2006b, p. 15; Pau-
welyn 2005, p. 133; Djordjevic 2002, p. 305-306. See for a thorough discussion on the 
interaction between the concepts of trade liberalization and regulatory autonomy: Kra-
jewski 2003. 
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tive.81 As indicated by Ortino, the difference in the type of restriction used in 
each provision has its reflection in the scope of each provision: ‗the more lenient 
the normative content, the broader is the reach of each provision‘.82 
As such, article XVII applies to all measures affecting the supply of services 
and requires only national treatment in respect of those measures. In contrast, 
article XV imposes a per se prohibition on a limited list of measures. Article VI 
can be placed in the middle, prescribing due process conditions to the adminis-
tration of all measures of general application and a reasonableness standard 
(transparency, objectivity and necessity) to licensing and qualification require-
ments and technical standards applying to services.83 
As is apparent from the different legal consequences, applying the appro-
priate GATS provision to measures is important. For example, applying the 
wrong type of provision may result in a market access restriction being treated 
as domestic regulation, frustrating liberalization. Alternately, as is emphasized 
in the literature, market access violations might be found in situations that 
properly fall within a Member‘s regulatory autonomy.84 
As will be discussed below, distinguishing which measure falls under which 
provision has proven difficult, as certain measures cannot be clearly classi-
fied.85 
                                         
81  See in particular Ortino 2006, p. 137-139. As indicated by Ortino, articles XVII and VI:5 
require regulatory instruments to be non-discriminatory and of a ‗reasonable nature‘ (i.e. 
regulation needs to be based on objective and transparent criteria and should not be 
more burdensome than necessary). To this can be added that article VI contains condi-
tions of a procedural nature, see §2.5.1. 
82  Ortino 2006, p. 139. 
83  Ortino 2006, p. 139. 
84  Pauwelyn 2005, p. 133; Ortino 2006, p. 141. A specific problem with classifying article 
VI measures erroneously under article XVI or XVII is that violations of these last provisions 
can only be justified with the exhaustive exceptions contained in articles XIV and XIV bis, 
whereas the range of policy justifications under article VI is open-ended. In addition, the 
burden of proof under article VI rests on the complainant whereas successful justification 
under articles XIV and XIV bis requires proof by the defendant. The conditions contained 
in the chapeau of articles XIV and XIV bis, including the requirement of non-
discrimination, are stricter than article VI as well. It is also important to remember that, 
contrary to article XVI and XVII, violations under article VI cannot be scheduled, see 
Pauwelyn 2005, p. 138-139. 
85  As is apparent from the wide variety of opinions regarding the matter among Members 
and in the literature, see below n 197. 
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2.5  Brief description of the provisions 
2.5.1 Article VI, domestic regulation 
The intention of article VI is to discipline those regulations that are not dealt 
with by the provisions on market access and national treatment but yet present 
unnecessary impediments to international trade in services.86 Article VI para-
graphs 1, 3, 5 and 6 only apply to sectors where specific commitments have 
been undertaken.87 The regulations intended to be captured by article VI are 
those that address objectives, in a non-discriminatory manner which fall within 
the scope of regulatory autonomy of the Members, yet do so in a manner that 
is not required in achieving that objective.88 
Article VI consists of three parts: procedural rules, a mandate relating to 
the development of disciplines concerning licensing, qualifications and technical 
standards and rules relating to the provisional application on the topic pro-
vided in the mandate.89 
The first three paragraphs and paragraph 6 provide procedural rules re-
ferred to by Delimatsis as introducing the concept of procedural due process in 
the GATS.90 Members are required to ensure that measures of general appli-
cation are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. Re-
garding specific administrative decisions, Members are required to provide 
independent review. Moreover, where appropriate, remedies for decisions that 
affect trade in services must be provided. Finally, transparency and due 
                                         
86  A thorough description of article VI GATS is provided in Delimatsis 2006b. 
87  As indicated, no commitments regarding article VI itself can be inscribed. Article VI pa-
ragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 6 only apply to sectors that have been scheduled. It is unclear 
whether this requires commitments under both XVI or XVII or whether a specific commit-
ment in one domain is enough, though the text seems to indicate the latter and I will 
adopt this approach, see Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 217. Article XVIII is included in 
the specific commitments part of the GATS. Thus scheduling a measure under this provi-
sion should trigger the application of article VI as well. In my opinion, it is safe to pre-
sume that article VI applies only insofar as commitments have been scheduled under ei-
ther provision. 
88  Delimatsis 2006b, p. 17; in the words of the Panel in US – Gambling, ‗… Members main-
tain the sovereign right to regulate within the parameters of Article VI of the GATS.‘, US 
– Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.316. 
89  Delimatsis 2006b, p. 18. 
90  Delimatsis 2006b, p. 32-33. Feketekuty describes due process as the opportunity to 
consult the government on the interpretation and application of regulations, to appeal 
regulatory decisions and to obtain a timely response to requests for regulatory decisions, 
Feketekuty 2000, p. 229-230. 
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process are required in procedures where a service supplier has made a re-
quest for authorization.91 
Paragraph 6 requires Members to provide adequate procedures to verify 
the competence of professionals of other Members. The only requirement is the 
availability of an adequate procedure, no substantial requirement is listed. 
Exactly what an adequate procedure entails is unclear.92 
Article VI:4 provides a mandate to the Council for Trade in Services relat-
ing to the development of disciplines (i.e. substantive rules) concerning qualifi-
cation requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing require-
ments. The standards included in paragraph 4 set a minimum that needs to be 
addressed by these disciplines, as is evident from the phrase ‗inter alia‘.93 
 
VI:4. 
With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not consti-
tute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in Services 
shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary dis-
ciplines.  Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, in-
ter alia: 
(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and the 
ability to  supply the service; 
                                         
91  Thus article VI:1 seems to apply to measures of general application while paragraphs 2, 
3 and 6 apply to measures with a specific scope such as administrative decisions, Wou-
ters & Coppens 2008, p. 218. Measures of general application affect ‗an unidentified 
number of economic operators‘ or ‗a range of situations or cases, rather than being li-
mited in their scope of application.‘, Delimatsis 2006b, p. 20, referring to article X GATT 
case law concerning the identical term. VI:1 does not refer to the substantive content of 
domestic regulations, but only to their administration. US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 
6.432; Wunsch-Vincent 2006, p. 388; Delimatsis 2006b, p. 19. Delimatsis provides an 
extensive description of the concept of ‗administration‘ based on case law regarding the 
comparable requirement contained in article X GATT. The distinction between the sub-
stance of measures and their administration becomes problematic for substantive meas-
ures that are administrative in nature. According to the case-law on current article X 
GATT, such measures are considered as administrative measures, Delimatsis 2006b, 
p. 21-24. For a thorough analysis of these procedural rules, see: Delimatsis 2006b, p. 
20-24, 28-31 and 31-35. See also: Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 217-219. 
92  Delimatsis 2006b, p. 47-48. 
93  Delimatsis 2006b, p. 18, the substance of article VI was left for future negotiations as 
the work on the market access and national treatment provisions took precedence, see: 
GATT (GNS) 1991c, par. 46. See also Krajewski 2003, p. 132-134. The obligation con-
tained in article VI:4 will apply in general and not only to committed sectors to licensing, 
qualifications and technical standards (as is the case with the provisional application of 
these obligations through article VI:5). Considering the far reaching consequences, the 
negotiations were left for another day, Delimatsis 2006b, p. 36-37.  
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(b)  not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; 
(c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the 
supply of the service. 
 
The mandate of article VI:4 has led the Council for Trade in Services to estab-
lish a Working Party on Professional Services (WPPS), tasked with the devel-
opment of multilateral disciplines in the accountancy sector.94 The resulting Dis-
ciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector were adopted but 
are not yet in force. The adoption of the Accountancy Disciplines will not take 
place before the conclusion of the Doha Round negotiations.95  
In contrast with the sector specific Accountancy Disciplines, the mandate is 
currently being used to negotiate horizontal disciplines on domestic regulation 
within the Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR).96 As expressed in a 
note by the secretariat, the Accountancy Disciplines should not be seen as set-
ting precedent but nevertheless constitute a helpful background for future work 
on article VI:4.97 
Article VI:5 provides for the provisional application of the requirements 
contained in the mandate of paragraph 4, but only in sectors where commit-
ments have been inscribed. 
 
VI:5.  
(a) In sectors in which a Member has undertaken specific commitments, pend-
ing the entry into force of disciplines developed in these sectors pursuant 
to paragraph 4, the  Member shall not apply licensing and qualification 
requirements and technical standards that nullify or impair such specific 
commitments in a manner which: 
(i) does not comply with the criteria outlined in subparagraphs 4(a), (b) 
or (c);  and 
(ii) could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at the time 
the specific commitments in those sectors were made. 
 
                                         
94  WTO (CTS) 1995. 
95  WTO (CTS) 1998a, for clarity hereinafter referred to as the Accountancy Disciplines. 
While the Accountancy Disciplines are not in force, Members that have inscribed specific 
commitments on accountancy should ‗to the fullest extent consistent with their existing leg-
islation, not take measures which would be inconsistent with these disciplines.‘ WTO (CTS) 
1998b, par. 2. 
96  Replacing the WPPS, see for a detailed description of the negotiations relating to the 
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation: Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 220-253. 
97  WTO (CTS) 1999, par. 6. 
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(b) In determining whether a Member is in conformity with the obligation un-
der paragraph 5(a), account shall be taken of international standards of 
relevant international organizations98 applied by that Member. 
 
Specific commitments may not be nullified or impaired through the application 
of domestic regulatory measures covering licensing, qualifications, or technical 
standards.99 The listed criteria in VI:5(a) apply cumulatively.100  
Depending on what is considered ‗reasonably expected‘ the effectiveness 
of article VI:5 could be greatly reduced. As all domestic regulation within the 
meaning of this provision already in place when a commitment is undertaken 
could be seen as reasonably expected, this provision would not apply to such 
regulations.101 
2.5.2  Article XVI, market access 
Article XVI contains the market access principle.102 This provision only applies if 
Members have undertaken a specific commitment. Paragraph 1 provides: 
 
‘With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Ar-
ticle I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, 
limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.’103 
                                         
98  (Original footnote) The term ‗relevant international organizations‘ refers to international 
bodies whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members of the 
WTO. 
99  For a discussion concerning the concept of nullification or impairment, see Delimatsis 
2006b, p. 41-45. 
100 That they apply cumulatively is apparent from the word ‗and‘. 
101 This view is supported by Pauwelyn and considered viable by Delimatsis, see Pauwelyn 
2005, p. 167-168 and Delimatsis 2006b, p. 40-41. This reading is supported by a Se-
cretariat Note: WTO (CTS) 1999, par. 11. Regarding existing commitments, this would 
entail that measures in place when the GATS entered into force in 1995 would be ex-
empted from article VI:5. However, as is apparent from discussion in the WPDR, not all 
Members agree to this reading, WTO (WPDR) 2003b, par. 16 and 30. For example: 
the Singapore representative expresses the opinion that this article could be said to ex-
empt pre-existing domestic regulation, while the Hong Kong, China representative ex-
pressed that the opposite could hold true as well: ‗If, for example, a Member undertook 
a commitment on mode 4 in a particular service sector, it would be expected that the 
Member eliminate procedures that would make it impossible for someone from abroad 
to have their qualifications certified.‘ 
102 A useful short assessment of this provision is provided by: Ortino 2006, p. 120-121. See 
also Mavroidis 2007, p. 3. 
103 (Original footnote) If a Member undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to 
the supply of a service through the mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(a) of 
article I and if the cross-border movement of capital is an essential part of the service it-
self, that Member is thereby committed to allow such movement of capital.  If a Member 
→ 
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As indicated by the Appellate Body, this paragraph in itself contains no obli-
gation, simply linking the market access obligation to the obligations a member 
has undertaken as inscribed in its schedule.104 
Article XVI paragraph 2 describes the substance of an article XVI commit-
ment as it lists the type of measures a member can no longer maintain if a full 
market access commitment has been inscribed. The listed measures are consi-
dered as particularly damaging for market access and unjustified from an eco-
nomic policy perspective.105 The list provided in paragraph 2 is exhaustive, a 
reading confirmed by the Panel in the Gambling case. Therefore, Members can 
maintain other measures restricting market access even if a full market access 
commitment has been inscribed.106 
The Panel‘s finding was not reviewed by the Appellate Body on appeal. 
However, as noted by Krajewski, the Appellate Body stated that the US could 
not maintain any of the listed measures by inscribing a full market access com-
mitment, which would seem to confirm the Panel‘s view.107 
                                         
undertakes a market-access commitment in relation to the supply of a service through the 
mode of supply referred to in subparagraph 2(c) of article I, it is thereby committed to 
allow related transfers of capital into its territory. 
104 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report par. 235. 
105 Zleptnig 2008, p. 392. Incorporating the market access discipline in the area of services 
has proven difficult, see above text at n. 73 and n. 78. 
106 For an explanation of earlier uncertainty regarding the exhaustive nature of the list, see: 
Krajewski 2003, p. 82-84, who concluded that the list is indeed exhaustive; implicit Mat-
too 1997, p. 109; Arup 2000, p. 121; see also the Scheduling Guidelines, par. 4. 
Article XVIII provides the possibility of scheduling other measures besides those subject to 
scheduling in article XVI and XVII, including measures relating to qualifications, stan-
dards, or licensing (the subject of article VI). If article XVI was not limited to the list pro-
vided in the second paragraph, the possibility of scheduling these other measures under 
a separate provision, article XVIII would not be needed. This reading of article XVI has 
been confirmed by the Panel in the Gambling case in a finding not reviewed by the 
Appllate Body, US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.298 and par. 6.318. See also Pau-
welyn 2005, p. 159; Krajewski 2005, p. 431-432; Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1064-1065 
and Zleptnig 2008, p. 393. 
107 Krajewski 2005, p. 431, referring to: US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 215 
and Zleptnig 2008, p. 401. Ortino, on the other hand, indicates that the Appellate Body 
would possibly disagree with the finding that the list in article XVI:2 is exhaustive. He 
considers the fact that the Appellate Body applies both article XVI:2(a) and (c) to the US 
measures as indicating the opinion that they are not really exhaustive in nature, as that 
would not allow for the limitations listed in subparagraphs (a) to (f) to apply cumulative-
ly. In my opinion this argument is incorrect as nothing prevents a measure from falling in-
to two categories of exhaustively formulated limitations. A measure can simply restrict 
both service suppliers and service transactions, thus falling within both subparagraph (a) 
and (c). I do not see why that would make those subparagraphs no longer exhaustive. 
Ortino cites Pauwelyn as source for the argument, yet Pauwelyn does not seem to indi-
cate such argument at the cited page, nor anywhere else in the specific publication, Orti-
no 2006, p. 137 fn 67 citing Pauwelyn 2005, p. 163. Ultimately, I do not think the Ap-
→ 
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Members can also inscribe partial commitments. Under article XVI a member 
inscribes a partial commitment by specifying one or more of the measures listed 
in paragraph 2 they wish to maintain.108 
XVI:2 provides:  
 
‘In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures 
which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional 
subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in 
its Schedule, are defined as: 
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of nu-
merical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the require-
ments of an economic needs test; 
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form 
of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; 
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quan-
tity of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in 
the form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;109 
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed 
in a particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ and 
who are necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific 
service in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic 
needs test; 
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint 
venture through which a service supplier may supply a service;  and 
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum 
percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual 
or aggregate foreign investment. 
 
 
Not only is the list contained in paragraph 2 exhaustive, the same applies to 
the elaborations contained within that list. The Gambling case confirmed that 
                                         
pellate Body would consider the XVI:2 list non-exhaustive as there is overwhelming evi-
dence and support for the exhaustive nature of that list, see above n 106. 
108 In contrast with article XVII and XVIII, where partial commitments can relate to any meas-
ure Members wish to exempt from their commitment, partial commitments under article 
XVI only specify the paragraph 2 measures they wish to maintain as the exhaustive na-
ture of the list renders scheduling other exceptions to the undergone commitment unneces-
sary. 
109 (Original footnote) Subparagraph 2(c) does not cover measures of a Member which limit 
inputs for the supply of services. 
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only measures in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service 
suppliers or the requirement of an economic needs test are addressed by ar-
ticle XVI:2(a) and only measures in the form of designated numerical units in the 
form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test are addressed by 
article XVI:2(c).110 
While this Panel ruling only applies to XVI:2(a) and (c), in my opinion the 
exhaustive nature of the elaborations should apply to sub (b) and (d) – (f) as 
well.111 The Panel conclusion was not reviewed by the Appellate Body on ap-
peal; it nevertheless seemed to implicitly agree when it stated that the words 
‗in the form of‘ should not be replaced by ‗that have the effect of‘.112 
2.5.3 Article XVII, national treatment 
Article XVII contains the national treatment provision. As with article XVI, article 
XVII only applies insofar as Members undertake specific commitments. Article 
XVII provides: 
 
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and ser-
vice suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the 
supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own 
like services and service suppliers.113 
                                         
110 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.325 regarding XVI:2 (a) and 6.341 regarding 
XVI:2 (c). 
111 XVI:2 (a) contains the phrase ‗whether in the form of‘. The Panel specifically indicated 
that the omission of the word ‗whether‘ in XVI:2 (c) is irrelevant. As the Panel‘s reasoning 
is based on the phrase ‗in the form of‘, logically the exhaustive nature of the elabora-
tions should also apply to XVI:2 (b) and (d), containing the same phrase. Moreover, I 
agree with Pauwelyn‘s implicit application of the Panel reading relating to XVI:2 sub (a) 
and (c) to all six definitions, as XVI:2 sub (e) and (f) are also formulated in an exhaustive 
manner, see Pauwelyn 2005, p. 159. This conclusion is less relevant regarding XVI:(e) as 
it does not contain an elaboration of forms the included measures can take by simply 
stating that measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint ven-
ture shall not be maintained. Note that article XVI:2(f) contains the phrase ‗in terms of‘. 
Nevertheless, I see no reason to apply different reasoning to this phrase, as it is equally 
formulated in an exhaustive manner as XVI:2 (a) to (d). 
112 Krajewski 2005, p. 432, referring to: US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 232. 
Note that the actual application by the Dispute Settlement Bodies of article XVI to the 
facts of the Gambling case have been heavily critiqued, which will be discussed below, 
see for example: Krajewski 2005, p. 432 and Pauwelyn 2005, p. 159-160. 
113 (Original footnote) Specific commitments assumed under this Article shall not be construed 
to require any Member to compensate for any inherent competitive disadvantages which 
result from the foreign character of the relevant services or service suppliers. 
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2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to ser-
vices and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical 
treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like ser-
vices and service suppliers. 
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be 
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of servic-
es or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service 
suppliers of any other Member. 
 
A recent Panel report adopted following a dispute between the United States 
and China relating to distribution services for publications and audiovisual en-
tertainment products provides a useful interpretation of article XVII.114 
A member scheduling a full commitment under article XVII would no longer 
be allowed to adopt any measure affecting the supply of the service sector to 
which the commitment applies, if that measure treats foreign services or service 
suppliers115 less favourably than domestic like services and like service suppli-
ers.116 As indicated in paragraph 2, both de jure and de facto discrimination 
are covered by article XVII.117 
In order for article XVII to apply, a measure needs to affect the supply of 
a service.  In EC – Bananas III, the Appellate Body gave article XVII, in analogy 
with its equivalent GATT provision, GATT article III, a broad interpretation.118 A 
measure does not have to regulate the provision of the service in question, it is 
enough that a measure has influence on the conditions of competition in the 
supply of a service, albeit that the measure must affect service suppliers in their 
capacity as service suppliers.119 
                                         
114 China – Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report. 
115 Regarding the criterion ‗service supplier of another Member‘ the Panel in China – Publi-
cations and Audiovisual Products had to establish whether foreign invested enterprises 
are to be seen as service suppliers of another Member. Regarding mode 3, the Panel 
concluded that this form of service provision requires the provision of a service through 
an entity ‗owned‘ or ‗controlled‘ by persons of another Member, China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products Panel Report, par. 7.973-7.974, repeated in several other para-
graphs. 
116 See also: China – Publications and Audiovisual Products Panel Report, par. 7.956. 
117 Mattoo 1997, p. 110, Krajewski 2003, p. 108, confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – 
Bananas III Appellate Body Report, par. 233. 
118 EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, par. 220. Article XXVIII, sub c GATS contains 
the following, non-exhaustive examples of measures affecting trade in services: the pur-
chase, payment or use of a service; the access to and use of, in connection with the 
supply of a service, services which are required by those Members to be offered to the 
public generally; the presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Member 
for the supply of a service in the territory of another Member. 
119 Krajewski 2003, p. 67-68; Van den Bossche & Denters 2007, p. 635. 
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Article XVII:3 defines less favourable treatment as modifying conditions of 
competition in favour of a Member‘s own services or service suppliers.120 In or-
der to determine whether the conditions of competition relating to the supply of 
the provision of a specific service are influenced, it must be clear which services 
or service suppliers are like services or like service providers. Competition is 
only distorted when services or service providers are competing and thus when 
likeness is established. The ‗likeness‘ criterion is therefore essential in establish-
ing whether the forms on non-discrimination that have been incorporated in the 
GATS are infringed. 
However, the GATS does not specify what determines likeness and as of 
yet there is no jurisprudence regarding the matter. Guidance regarding the 
term likeness can be found in GATT jurisprudence as article III GATT contains 
the similar principle of ‗like products‘.121 
Determining whether services or service suppliers are ‗like‘ leads to difficult 
questions such as ‗is the underwriting of a bond issue ‗like‘ a bank lending 
transaction?‘ and ‗are European art movies and American action movies ‗like‘ 
services?‘122 As noted by Van den Bossche, two service providers providing like 
services are not automatically like service providers. The size of the company, 
the used technology and the experience of the company are all conditions that 
                                         
120 See for an extensive description of the concept of less favourable treatment, including a 
comparison with the same principle in the GATT: Ortino 2008, p. 177-186. 
121 GATT and WTO jurisprudence regarding article III GATT has not led to a predictable 
and consistent approach determining when products are ‗like‘, Nicolaïdis & Trachtman 
2000, p. 254-255. 
Factors determining whether products can be considered as like products are inter alia: 
the physical characteristics of products, the habits and preferences of consumers regard-
ing the products, the purpose for which the products are used and the international ta-
riff-classification of the products. For the last factor the classification list in services could 
be used, Van den Bossche & Denters 2007, p. 635. A complicating factor in the use of 
classification systems is that more than one system is in use, Fernandes 2008, p. 137. The 
following classification systems are used regarding services: the UN Central Product 
Classification (CPC), UN 2008a, the Services Sectoral Classification List, GATT (GNS) 
1991a (W120 list), and the International Standard Industrial Classification of all eco-
nomic activities (ISIC), UN 2008b, all available through the UN statistics division website: 
<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regct.asp?Lg=1>. The use of different classifi-
cation systems is problematic as the W/120 list is based on the CPC list but is not iden-
tical. The W/120 list combines several CPC classifications in one sub-sector. Moreover, 
the CPC list was created for statistical purposes and therefore not necessarily based on 
competitive relationships of services, Krajewski 2003, p. 101. 
122 These examples are provided by Nicolaïdis & Trachtman 2000, p. 252 and Van den 
Bossche & Denters 2007, p. 635. 
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must be taken into account.123 Ultimately, determining likeness requires an ex-
amination on a case by case basis.124 
2.5.4 Article XVIII, additional commitments 
Article XVIII reads: 
 
Members may negotiate commitments with respect to measures affecting 
trade in services not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI or XVII, includ-
ing those regarding qualifications, standards or licensing matters.  Such com-
mitments shall be inscribed in a Member's Schedule. 
 
Article XVIII does not contain any legal obligations. As is apparent from the 
text, some restrictions to trade in services do not fall within the scope of article 
XVI or XVII. Thus non-discriminatory measures, not similar to the limitations listed 
in article XVI:2 can be inscribed under article XVIII.125 The fact that article XVIII 
provides no description regarding the measures that can be scheduled under 
this provision indicates that a definition for such measures could not be pro-
vided.126 
The text of article XVIII clearly delineates additional commitments from 
those inscribed under articles XVI and XVII, as article XVIII only relates to 
measures that do not fall under those provisions.127 
However, article XVIII is connected to the mandate included in article 
VI:4.128 The overlap between these two provisions can be understood as fol-
lows. Article VI:4 provides a mandate for the development of horizontally ap-
plicable disciplines relating to qualifications, technical standards and licensing 
requirements. Prior to the development and application of these disciplines 
Members can inscribe commitments relating to qualifications, standards and 
licensing matters under article XVIII.129 Note that article XVIII is not limited to 
the type of measures described in VI:4, as is apparent from the word ‗includ-
                                         
123 Van den Bossche 2005, p. 323-324. 
124 Nicolaïdis & Trachtman 2000, p. 255. 
125 US – Gambling Panel Report par. 6.311, WTO (CSC) 2002, par. 3 and Delimatsis 
2006a, p. 1062. 
126 US – Gambling Panel Report par. 6.311, WTO (CSC) 2002, par. 3. For various exam-
ples of additional commitments, see: WTO (CSC) 2002 under II and attachment 1. 
127 As also noted by Pauwelyn 2005, p. 152 and Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1075. 
128 WTO (CSC) 2002, par. 4, recognised by the Panel in US – Gambling Panel Report par. 
6.312. See also Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 216. 
129 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1075. 
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ing‘.130 An example can be found in the regulatory disciplines of the Reference 
Paper on Telecommunications which were inscribed by several Members mak-
ing use of article XVIII.131 
 
 
                                         
130 US – Gambling Panel Report par. 6.312; WTO (CSC) 2002, par. 3 and 4; see also: 
Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1075.  
131 WTO (CSC) 2002, par. 15 and 16; Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1075. See for an extensive 
description of the Reference Paper: Bronckers & Larouche 2008, p. 330-347. The Refer-
ence Paper itself can be found on the website of the WTO: <www.wto.org>, trade top-
ics, services, sector-by-sector, telecommunications services. It is also included in Bronckers 
& Larouche 2008, p. 377-378. 
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PART 3 ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
After considering the GATS approach towards liberalizing international trade 
in services and an overview of the relevant GATS provisions, it is hoped that 
the basic concepts are now clear. In light of the above analysis, the provision 
on additional commitments in context with the other provisions should not lead 
to specific problems. Therefore, it is not necessary to deal with article XVIII in 
the rest of this paper. However, the text and context of the other provisions 
leave much uncertain. The uncertainties regarding these provisions lead to sev-
eral problems which will be addressed in the remainder of this paper: 
-  Distinguishing VI measures from XVI/XVI measures (§3.1) 
-  How to draw the line between VI and XVI   (§3.2) 
-  How to draw the line between articles XVI and XVII   (§3.3) 
-  Specific problem in relationship between articles VI, XVI and XVII GATS   
(§3.4) 
-  Does article XVI apply to discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures?   
(§3.5) 
3.1 Distinguishing VI measures from XVI/XVI measures 
As has been explained, classifying measures according to their appropriate 
GATS provision is of great importance, as the legal consequences attached to 
each provision are different. A particularly thorny issue relates to drawing a 
line between domestic regulation and measures addressed by specific commit-
ments. The uncertainty relating to the scope of articles VI on the one hand and 
XVI and XVII on the other, resurfaced after the Gambling case and the aca-
demic debate that followed its adoption. 
3.1.1 The interpretation in Gambling on VI:4/5 and XVI/XVII 
The interaction between article VI on domestic regulation and articles XVI/XVII 
on market access and national treatment is not explicitly regulated in the 
GATS. Case-law regarding articles VI:4 and 5 exists in the form of the Panel 
ruling in the Gambling case.132 While Antigua claimed that paragraphs 1 and 
3 had been breached by the United States measures as well, the Panel ruled 
that Antigua had not made a ‗prima facie demonstration that the measures at 
issue are inconsistent with articles VI:1 and 3.‘133 
 
                                         
132 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.305. 
133 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.437. The Appellate Body did not rule on article VI. 
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The Panel concluded that articles VI:4 and 5 and XVI are mutually exclu-
sive. As noted by Wouters and Coppens, the Panel implicitly extended this con-
clusion to article XVII.134 However, this specific conclusion has received convinc-
ing critique and should, in my opinion, be rejected.135 On appeal, the Appel-
late Body felt it was neither necessary nor appropriate to rule on article VI 
and draw the line between quantitative and qualitative measures.136 As such it 
did not confirm nor reject the Panel‘s conclusion on mutual exclusivity.137 
The Panel based its conclusion on the Scheduling Guidelines 1993 and an 
informal Chairman Note of the WPPS attached to the Scheduling Guidelines 
2001.138 
The Scheduling Guidelines 1993 indicate that: ‗Minimum requirements such 
as those common to licensing criteria (e.g. minimum capital requirements for the 
establishment of a corporate entity) do not fall within the scope of article 
XVI.‘139 
The Chairman‘s Note basically states that disciplines to be developed un-
der article VI:4 cover domestic regulatory measures which are not regarded as 
market access limitations as such, and which do not in principle discriminate 
against foreign suppliers. Accordingly, new disciplines must not overlap with 
articles XVI (and XVII), as this would create legal uncertainty.140 
In my opinion, these Panel arguments should be rejected. The text of article 
VI:4/5 does not indicate that it does not apply to the measures specified in 
article XVI. This would elevate an approach based on an informal note and 
                                         
134 ‗[T]he organization of the GATS (…) cast(s) light on the inter-relationship between Ar-
ticles XVI, XVII and XVIII, the last of which can include measures falling within the scope of 
Article VI:4‘. Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 231, referring to US – Gambling Panel Re-
port, par. 6.309 (emphasis added). See also par. 6.311. 
135 As will be discussed here, critique is provided by Pauwelyn and Delimatsis, however 
Wouters & Coppens agree with the Panel conclusion. 
136 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 250. Analysing the measures at issue in the 
Gambling case under article XVI does have implications for the question where that line 
lies, as will be discussed below, see: Pauwelyn 2005, p. 163 fn 111 and Irwin & Weiler 
2008, p. 98. 
Note that the US claimed that the measures at issue in the dispute should be interpreted 
as domestic regulation in the general sense of the GATS, thus as part of the concept rec-
ognized in the preamble and not domestic regulation in the sense of article VI, see: US – 
Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 26. 
137 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 250. Both Pauwelyn and Delimatsis indicate 
that the Appellate Body most likely would not agree with the Panel conclusion regarding 
article VI:4 and 5, Pauwelyn 2005, p. 163 and Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1070 fn 58. 
138 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.305-6.308. Note that the Panel considered these 
documents as part of the context for interpreting the GATS within the meaning of article 
31 VCLT. 
139 Scheduling Guidelines 1993, par. 5. 
140 Scheduling Guidelines 2001, attachment 4; WTO (WPPS) 1998, par. 2 and 3. 
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supplementary means of interpretation above the clear text of the GATS itself. 
Moreover, the arguments provided by the Panel do not support a different 
conclusion. 
While indeed minimum capital requirements do not fall within the scope of 
article XVI, other examples lead to a different conclusion. Delimatsis and Kra-
jewski point out that articles VI:4 and 5 can address domestic licensing systems 
that contain quantitative restrictions, e.g. regarding the number of service sup-
pliers.141 
The overlap between articles VI:4/5 and XVII can be demonstrated as 
well. The Scheduling Guidelines contain a reference relating to the division be-
tween article VI and article XVII. The provided example in the Guidelines spe-
cifies that discriminatory residency requirements must be scheduled under ar-
ticle XVII. If the residency requirement is not discriminatory, it would be subject 
to the disciplines of Article VI:5.142 In my opinion this remark does not claim that 
the text of article VI:4/5 excludes discriminatory measures from its scope. Ra-
ther it is meant precisely to address the issue of possible overlap. The provided 
example of a de facto discriminatory requirement that service suppliers should 
demonstrate prior residence before supplying a service shows that the provi-
sions do overlap. This measure could be perceived to be more burdensome 
than necessary to ensure the quality of the service within the meaning of article 
VI:4. It would also fall within the scope of article XVII.143 
The Chairman‘s Note on which the Panel relies contains an explanation of 
the approach the WPPS took on the relationship between articles VI:4 and 
XVI/XVII when drafting the Accountancy Disciplines. It is true that the Accoun-
tancy Disciplines, so far the only product of the mandate in article VI:4, provide 
that the disciplines are mutually exclusive with articles XVI and XVII.144 Moreo-
ver, the Chairman‘s Note states that future disciplines should contain a similar 
provision, in order to prevent duplication of the obligations contained in articles 
XVI and XVII. However, there is no such provision in the general GATS system. 
Naturally, the fact that the Accountancy Disciplines provide for mutual exclu-
siveness between articles XVI and XVII and state that future disciplines should 
                                         
141 Krajewski 2003, p. 140, Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1070, see also: Pauwelyn 2005, p. 156 
fn 88. 
142 Scheduling Guidelines 1998, par. 5, Scheduling Guidelines 2001, par. 14. 
143 Scheduling Guidelines  1998, par. 5, Scheduling Guidelines 2001, par. 14. See also: 
Krajewski 2003, p. 140. 
144 Accountancy Disciplines article 1. 
Tans: The GATS Approach towards Liberalization 
 
 
42 
 
do likewise does not address the current relationship between article VI:4/5 
and XVI.145 
Wouters and Coppens indicate on the one hand that there is overlap be-
tween articles VI:4/5 and XVI yet they also accept the reasoning of the Panel 
and state that articles VI:4/5 and XVI/XVII are mutually exclusive.146 This view 
should, in my opinion be rejected as well. Similar to the Panel‘s conclusion, they 
rely on several WPPS and WPDR documents.147 While I certainly agree with 
their conclusion that there should be no overlap, this does not change the fact 
that the text of the GATS leads to the conclusion that both article VI:4/5 and 
XVI address discriminatory measures. 
Nevertheless the assumption that overlap should be prevented is correct. As 
noted by Pauwelyn, it is important that the issue of overlap between article 
VI:4 and articles XVI/XVII is specifically addressed in disciplines developed on 
                                         
145 In her discussion of the scope of future disciplines derived from the mandate contained in 
VI:4, Terry indicates a growing consensus within the WPDR to consider measures ad-
dressed by article VI:4 disciplines to be mutually exclusive with articles XVI and XVII, 
Terry 2003, p. 96-98. As indicated by Pauwelyn, this would entail mutually exclusiveness 
with a preference for market access over domestic regulation. This is the opposite situa-
tion from that established under the GATT where the Ad Note to article III provides that 
measures that apply to imports and domestic products should be considered under article 
III on domestic regulation. For a more thorough explanation, see: Pauwelyn 2005, p. 142 
and 156. While it is certainly possible that the WPDR will incorporate such mutual exclu-
sivity in future disciplines, as has been done earlier with the Accountancy Disciplines, the 
text of articles VI and XVI and XVII do not provide for this. See also Pauwelyn 2005, 
p. 156 fn 88 and p. 157. 
146 Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 229: ‗Article VI:4 is not explicitly limited to strictly non-
discriminatory measures‘ p. 230: ‗Although some authors criticize this narrow approach, 
most tend to agree that there should be no overlap‘  (footnote omitted, emphasis add-
ed), and referring to the Panel‘s conclusion that article VI:4/5 and article XVI are mu-
tually exclusive on p. 231: ‗This conclusion of the Panel can be extended to the relation-
ship between Article VI:4/5 and Article XVII (…) Thus, there can be no overlap between 
measures falling within the scope of Article VI:4 and Article XVII.‘ (Emphasis added). 
147 Note that their references in fn 124 specifically address the remark that most authors 
tend to agree that there should be no overlap. 
Nevertheless, Krajewski indeed states that: ‗Article VI applies to non-discriminatory 
measures, whereas Article XVII applies to discriminatory measures.‘, Krajewski 2003, 
p. 112. I do not see how such disciplines based on article VI:4 could overlap with article 
XVI/XVII while article VI:4 itself does not allow for such overlap. As stated by Krajewski 
himself: ‗Neither Article VI:4 nor Articles XVI and XVII explicitly address this question. It is 
not inconceivable that a measure could come in the ambit of both sets of disciplines‘, Kra-
jewski 2003, p. 139-140. Possibly Krajewski‘s claim that article VI does not address dis-
criminatory measures should be seen in the light of the more general claim that article VI 
is part of a three-pronged approach to effective access to services markets (see above n 
71). Within that approach article VI is seen to address non-discriminatory domestic regu-
lations, supplementing articles XVI and XVII which prohibit market access restrictions and 
discriminatory measures., Krajewski 2003, p. 130. 
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the basis of the VI:4 mandate. If measures falling within the scope of article XVI 
and XVII are excluded from the application of disciplines on domestic regula-
tion then scheduled measures cannot be scrutinized according to the obligations 
specified under VI:4 and 5. If on the other hand, measures scheduled under XVI 
or XVII still have to comply with disciplines on domestic regulation, a conflict 
could arise as the scheduled measure may run afoul of the obligations con-
tained in the disciplines.148 Therefore, the answer to the mutual exclusivity ques-
tion has significant consequences. 
Regarding the current provisional application of these conditions through 
article VI:5, Pauwelyn indicates that the overlap problem does not arise due to 
the condition contained in article VI:5(a)(ii) that a measure could not reasonably 
have been expected by other WTO Members. As a possible conflict arises with 
scheduled measures this condition would not be fulfilled.149 
To conclude, the following statements can be made. Article VI and XVI/XVII 
are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, there appears to be a growing con-
sensus among Members in the WPDR that future disciplines and specific com-
mitments should be mutually exclusive. As the choice between non-exclusiveness 
and exclusiveness has significant consequences, it is advisable that future dis-
ciplines indeed specifically deal with this matter. 
3.1.2 Provisions complementary 
In the absence of clear case-law on the subject, the relationship between ar-
ticles VI and articles XVI/XVII can best be understood as complementary. Key 
to understanding the issue is that measures can consist of various elements, each 
possibly addressed by different GATS provisions.150 Therefore, each respec-
tive element of a measure can be dealt with under the relevant provision.151 
                                         
148 This problem is also recognised by Krajewski and Wouters and Coppens, Krajewski 
2003, p. 113 and Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 231. 
149 See §2.5.1. Possible solutions once disciplines on domestic regulation are developed 
without providing for mutual exclusiveness are to regard XVI or XVII as lex specialis as 
specific commitments have been inscribed. However, the opposite can be argued as well. 
Future disciplines on domestic regulation may be considered as lex posterior, thus pre-
vailing over commitments, in particular regarding advantages and disadvantages of 
both options, Pauwelyn 2005, p. 157-158, fn 92 and 93. See the listed solutions in 
§3.1.1. 
150 As indicated by the secretariat during WPDR meetings: ‗In the GATS context, there 
needed to be a distinction between a licensing system and its various components, in 
terms of their different requirements and different measures. Licensing systems could be 
composed of both Articles XVI and XVII and Article VI:4 measures, the Secretariat had 
noted, and there was no overlap.‘ WTO (WPDR) 2003a, par. 12 and WTO (WPDR) 
2001, par. 44, see also the clear statement by the US delegate in par. 43. 
151 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1070. 
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As noted by Delimatsis, article VI:1 applies to sectors where a Member has 
undertaken specific commitments. Thus measures affecting trade in these service 
sectors will be scrutinized on the basis of the inscribed commitment under 
XVI/XVII, as well as under article VI:1 with respect to the measure‘s administra-
tion.152 The information requirements contained in VI:3 should be complied with 
when a measure contains authorization requirements. Finally, article VI:6 ap-
plies to verification procedures of professionals.153 
Similarly, a quantitative licensing system should be evaluated according to 
article XVI regarding the quantitative restriction and according to article VI:4 
and 5 regarding the licensing requirement. Article XVII would address any dis-
criminatory elements of the measure.154 
The addendum to the Scheduling Guidelines confirms this understanding by 
indicating that article XVI continues to apply to measures that also fall within 
the scope of articles VI:4 and 5.155 
The understanding that the provisions on domestic regulation and specific 
commitments are complementary leaves two uncertainties. In the first place, it is 
still unclear where the line between measures falling under article VI and XVI 
should be drawn. In the second place, the clearer delineation between articles 
VI and XVII may nevertheless still lead to problems. 
3.2 How to draw the line between VI and XVI 
A fundamental problem left unclear by the text of the GATS lies in discerning 
between domestic regulation and market access restrictions. While the other 
paragraphs of article VI (concerning administration of measures and authoriza-
tion requirements) has been fairly unproblematic, distinguishing VI:4 and 5 
measures from XVI measures has proven difficult. 
The basic distinction between market access and domestic regulation can 
be explained as follows: 
Articles VI:4 and 5 address qualification requirements and procedures, 
technical standards and licensing requirements (QTL requirements). Market 
access restrictions can be considered as ‗maximum limitations‘ regulating the 
                                         
152 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1070 fn 58. See also: Pauwelyn 2005, p. 152. 
153 Note that article VI:2 only contains the institutional obligation to set up judicial, arbitral 
or administrative tribunals or procedures, and not substantive obligations which could 
overlap with other provisions in the GATS. 
154 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1070. 
155 Scheduling Guidelines 1993 addendum 1, p. 1 and in slightly different wording: Sche-
duling Guidelines 2001, par. 11. Note that Pauwelyn refers to the Scheduling Guidelines 
2001 and not to the addendum, but this seems to be an error. Pauwelyn 2005, p. 156 fn 
85. 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2010/08 
 
 
45 
 
‗quantity‘ of services and service suppliers.156 QTL requirements are ‗minimum 
requirements‘ that regulate the quality of a service or the ability of a service 
supplier.157 
Another way of looking at the difference is that market access restrictions 
entail limitations that cannot be overcome by an act of the supplier. In contrast, 
QTL requirements can be fulfilled by the supplier, for instance by obtaining 
required qualifications.158 
It should be noted that measures imposing qualitative requirements on ser-
vices or service suppliers can have a quantitative effect. This does not automat-
ically turn such measures into market access limitations.159 
3.2.1 The scope of article XVI as defined in the Gambling case  
As explained in part 2.5.2, the Gambling case confirmed two important limita-
tions relating to article XVI. In the first place, the list contained in article XVI:2 is 
exhaustive. Thus, market access restrictions covered by article XVI are limited to 
the specifically listed measures in subparagraphs (a) to (f). In the second place, 
the elaborations contained within subparagraphs (a) and (c) are also exhaus-
tive. As explained, in my opinion the exhaustive nature of the elaborations ap-
plies to XVI:2 in its entirety.  Therefore, only measures in the listed forms are 
addressed by article XVI.160 
While narrowly interpreting the scope of article XVI, the outcome of the 
Gambling case nevertheless held that the measures in question, by prohibiting 
the remote supply of gambling and betting services should be seen as market 
access restrictions covered by article XVI:2(a) and (c) because the prohibition 
amounted to a ‗zero quota‘. 
The crucial aspect of the case leading to this conclusion is made up of two 
parts. The first element is that the Appellate Body did not repeal the Panel 
conclusion that the measures at issue (the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Il-
legal Gambling Business Act) had the same effect as a zero quota. The second 
                                         
156 As noted by Pauwelyn, article XVI:2(e) and (f) are different as they address legal entity 
and foreign equity participation, Pauwelyn 2005, p. 153 fn 74. 
157 Scheduling Guidelines 1993, par. 5, Scheduling Guidelines 2001, par. 11; Pauwelyn 
2005, p. 153; Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1070; Zleptnig 2008, p. 394. As indicated in the 
Scheduling Guidelines, quantitative restrictions can be expressed numerically or through 
the criteria specified in XVI:2(a) to (d), Scheduling Guidelines 1993, par. 4 and 5. 
158 Pauwelyn 2005, p. 153. See also: Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1069. 
159 Pauwelyn 2005, p. 159-160, Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1070 fn 62. See also US – Gambling 
Panel Report, par. 6.304. 
160 See: §2.5.2. Note that the Gambling case only explicitly confirmed the exhaustive nature 
of elaborations contained in XVI:2(a) and (c). 
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element is that the Panel and Appellate Body consider a measure that has the 
same effect as a zero quota to be covered by article XVI:2(a) and (c).161 
3.2.2 The measures having the same effect as a zero quota 
As summarized by Irwin and Weiler, the Panel concluded that: ‗(i) as regards a 
particular service, a Member that has made an unlimited market access com-
mitment under mode 1 commits itself not to maintain measures that prohibit the 
use of one, several or all means of delivery of that service; and (ii) a Member 
that has made a market access commitment in a sector or subsector has commit-
ted itself in respect of all services that fall within the relevant sector or subsec-
tor.‘162 The Panel then concluded that all of three US measures at issue re-
stricted the means of delivery and moreover restricted part of the committed 
sector.163 
On appeal, the United States did not challenge the Panel‘s conclusions that 
measures restricting either means of supply or (sub-) service sector were limita-
tions under article XVI:2. The Appellate Body thus decided to limit its examina-
tion and did not rule on the matter.164 
Although Pauwelyn considers that the Appellate Body sidestepped the 
Panel‘s conclusion on this point, it seems rather that the Appellate Body implicit-
ly accepted that the measures in question, by restricting modes of supply or a 
(sub-) sector indeed have an effect similar to a zero quota, and proceeded to 
decide the case on this basis.165 As indicated by Irwin & Weiler, since this issue 
is pivotal to the outcome of the case it would have been better if the Appellate 
Body had expressly addressed the point.166 
Three possible scenarios can be envisaged. A first approach would be to 
follow the reasoning adopted by the Panel that restricting even one means of 
supply would amount to a market access restriction. This approach should in my 
opinion be rejected. Without examining what type of measure listed in article 
XVI:2 might be used for the prohibition on remote supply, the Panel indicated 
                                         
161 As explained by Irwin & Weiler 2008, p. 88-89, see also Ortino 2006, p. 118 fn 4. 
162 Irwin & Weiler 2008, p. 88, summarizing US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.287 and 
6.290. 
163 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.363-6.364 (Wire Act), 6.370-6.372 (Travel Act) 
and 6.377-6.379 (Illegal Gambling Business Act). As exemplified by the facts of the 
Gambling case, the prohibition of remote supply falls under the first Panel conclusion 
while the prohibition of the sub-sector ‗gambling and betting services‘ as part of the ser-
vice sector ‗other recreational services‘ falls under the second. 
164 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 220 and 239. 
165 Pauwelyn 2005, p. 163, Irwin & Weiler 2008, p. 88-89 and Zleptnig 2008, p. 404. 
166 Irwin & Weiler 2008, p. 88-89. 
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that an article XVI limitation had been found, an approach that contradicts the 
exhaustive nature of article XVI:2.167 
Moreover, the Panel indicated that ‗[i]f a Member desires to exclude mar-
ket access with respect to the supply of a service through one, several or all 
means of delivery included in mode 1, it should do so explicitly in its sche-
dule‘.168 However, as noted by Low and Mattoo ‗since the only restriction that 
may be scheduled under GATS article XVI:2 are those that are listed, this im-
plies that limitations on the means by which a service is delivered can neither 
be scheduled nor directly disallowed‘.169 
A second approach, comparable with Pauwelyn‘s reasoning, entails the 
exact opposite. According to Pauwelyn, the fact that the prohibition on remote 
supply coincides with a complete prohibition of a particular mode of trade in 
services (mode 1) does not lead to a market access restriction. That the meas-
ure bans a means of supply or even all means of supply might become relevant 
under either article VI or XVII but the only way it can be relevant under article 
XVI is if it makes use of the exhaustive list of market access restrictions. There 
might be better alternatives than a complete ban on remote supply, yet that is 
a question to be addressed under article VI:4/5 and future disciplines.170 
A third approach, indicated by several authors, takes the view that it 
would be preferable to distinguish between measures that prohibit all means 
of supply and measures that only restrict one or several means. As such, the 
Panel and Appellate Body conclusions regarding measures that in effect 
amount to a zero quota would apply to measures that completely restrict all 
                                         
167 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.285-6.287. Pauwelyn 2005, p. 163; Zleptnig 2008, 
p. 400-401. Zleptnig indicates that this approach turns the provision on its head as the 
normal focus should be on the measures, yet the Panel had already found a limitation 
without consulting the list contained in XVI:2. 
The Panel was accused of being overly concerned with trying to capture measures that 
would allow circumvention of article XVI. See for the reasoning that this risk is minimal: 
Pauwelyn 2005, p. 166. To this can be added that article XVI is not meant to outlaw all 
restrictions of market access, just those that are considered most damaging. The XVI:2 list 
is exhaustive and it is possible to limit market access through other means than the meas-
ures listed. Mattoo provides the example of fiscal measures, which do not fall within the 
scope of article XVI:2 yet have the possibility to severely limit market access, Mattoo 
1997, p. 109. 
168 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.286. 
169 Low & Mattoo 2000, p. 454. The argument in this paragraph is derived from Wunsch-
Vincent 2006, p. 333. See also Adlung & Roy, p. 1177-1178 who indicate that the 
schedules of commitments contain many wrongfully entered inscriptions under the article 
XVI column, both misplaced national treatment entries and inscriptions relating to other 
measures than those listed in XVI:2. 
170 Pauwelyn 2005, p. 166-167. Thus, Pauwelyn considers the measures as technical stan-
dards defining how the service is to be provided. 
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means of supply. The conclusions would also apply when measures result in the 
total exclusion of the product from the market. On the other hand, the prohibi-
tion of a means of delivery, for instance the electronic delivery of a service, 
would not amount to a quota on total value or volume if there are other means 
of cross-border delivery left.171 
It should be noted that the Gambling case concerned measures that com-
pletely restricted trade in gambling services through mode 1 to the United 
States.172 It is not at all certain how the Appellate Body would decide cases 
where means of delivery are restricted while other means remain available.173 
At this point, the differences in opinions regarding the specific measures in 
Gambling become apparent. Pauwelyn considers the measures to be qualita-
tive measures with quantitative effects. It should be stressed that the various 
opinions examined in this paper do not disagree with his conclusion that such 
measures should not be treated under article XVI.174 However, several com-
mentators do disagree with his qualification of the measures in the Gambling 
case as qualitative measures. As Wunsch-Vincent emphasizes, this particular 
case is not to be confused with qualitative measures that have a quantitative 
effect. The mode 1 commitment inscribed by the US indicates agreement to 
postal, electronic or other remote ways of delivering the service. However, the 
total prohibition of electronic delivery in practice amounts to a ‗significant mar-
ket access limitation‘.175 
                                         
171 Zleptnig 2008, p. 406. This approach is suggested by Mattoo & Schuknecht in the con-
text of electronic commerce, Mattoo & Schuknecht 2000, p. 15; see also Wunsch-Vincent 
2006, p. 341-342. 
172 Remote supply and cross-border supply are two different concepts. While cross-border 
supply requires remote supply, cross-border supply presumes that consumer and supplier 
are in different WTO Member territories. As is apparent, restricting remote supply en-
tails a complete restriction of mode 1, US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.32; Wunsch-
Vincent 2006, p. 341; Zleptnig 2008, p. 387. This complete restriction is also empha-
sized by Delimatsis in his explanation: ‗the Appellate Body accepted that a total prohibi-
tion equivalent to a zero quota (in that it forbids altogether the market access through 
mode 1 to service suppliers and hence limits their number to zero), is a measure of nu-
merical nature‘, Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1066, referring to US – Gambling Appellate Body 
Report par. 227-233. 
173 Zleptnig 2008, p. 406-407. 
174 Pauwelyn 2005, p. 159-160; Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1070 fn 62. See also US – Gambling 
Panel Report, par. 6.304. Irwin & Weiler indicate that ‗almost any regulatory regime 
can translate into some quantitative numerical impact on the provision of services‘. 
Where such regulation addresses not just the commercial arrangement of the provision of 
the service (opening hours or labour protection) but the service itself (prohibition of TV 
advertising of tobacco or alcohol) the regulation will amount to some form of ‗zero quo-
ta‘ on a service provider providing only that service, Irwin & Weiler 2008, p. 96. 
175 Wunsch-Vincent 2006, p. 341-342. See also: Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1071. Pauwelyn 
provides the example of taxi drivers and the requirement of passing a driving test, an 
→ 
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In my opinion, several of the concerns expressed in the literature are based 
on the assumption that the Gambling ruling has broadened the scope of article 
XVI to the detriment of article VI and that this brings domestic regulations un-
der the strict regime of the market access provision.176 Admittedly, it remains to 
be seen how the next case will be decided, yet I do not think that this is what 
the Gambling ruling entails. The scope of article XVI is still determined by the 
type of measure in question and not just by the fact that a measure restricts a 
means of supply. However, if a measure completely restricts all means of 
supply this approach assumes that this type of measure is a market access re-
striction.177 
As a final point, Irwin and Weiler suggest an interesting approach towards 
the problem of distinguishing qualitative and quantitative measures within the 
GATS by a comparison with the GATT regime and European Community law. 
Noting that caution is required as the EC and WTO are very different organi-
sations, they propose that the distinction can run parallel with the Dassonville 
and Keck decisions of the ECJ.178 They indicate that this approach entails that: 
‗a State measure that has a quantitative effect will be caught by the Market 
Access provision only when the effect in question is such as to totally exclude 
the product from the marketplace‘ and that this balance could be useful in the 
context of the WTO, both for the GATT and GATS.179 This approach seems to 
                                         
example that indeed clearly falls in the category of a qualitative measure with the 
quantitative effect of restricting service supply by those who have not passed this test. 
While this is a good example, in my opinion, the reasoning adopted by the Appellate 
Body in the Gambling case would not lead this example to be classified as a market 
access restriction. In response to Pauwelyn‘s example, Zleptnig indicates that a total pro-
hibition of Internet-based services cannot be compared with a taxi driver passing a driv-
ing test, Zleptnig 2008, p. 407-408. 
176 Notably Krajewski 2005; Ortino 2006 and Pauwelyn 2005. 
177 According to this approach, this is different from concluding that measures having the 
effect of the measures listed in article XVI:2 are market access restrictions. An example 
can clarify this. A complete restriction on the means of supply, for instance a ban on the 
use of remote means of supply completely restricting mode 1 service supply, is a zero 
quota. A measure that requires diplomas or a license conditional on the use of environ-
mental friendly products when supplying a service (for example in the transport sector), 
will have a similar effect as a numerical quota, in the sense that the number of service 
suppliers will be less due to the requirements, but not in a manner listed in article XVI:2. 
A complete restriction of supply would fall within the category of market access restric-
tions as the inscribed commitment is completely frustrated. While the theory behind this 
extension might not be without flaw, the simple conclusion is not to inscribe a commitment 
while maintaining a complete restriction on the supply of the sector in question. 
178 Case 8-74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] ECR 00837; 
Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Bernard Keck and 
Daniel Mithouard [1993] ECR I-06097. 
179 Irwin & Weiler 2008, p. 102-105. 
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suggest that a new line needs to be drawn, a line that will demarcate zero ef-
fect measures (as caught by XVI) and measures that leave sufficient room for 
supply (thus not caught by XVI). 
3.2.3 Prohibition of service is a ‘zero quota’ 
The second step leading to the conclusion that the measures at issue in the 
Gambling case restricting remote supply are market access restrictions results 
from the argument that measures amounting to a zero quota are covered by 
article XVI:2(a) and (c).  
The Panel indicated that the prohibition of a service should be seen as a 
‗zero quota‘ which is therefore covered by subparagraphs (a) and (c).180 The 
Panel argued that a zero quota was not included in XVI:2(a) because it ‗was 
not drafted to cover situations where a Member wants to maintain full limita-
tions.‘ A Member would not schedule a commitment if it would have wanted to 
maintain a full prohibition.181 The Appellate Body repeated and agreed with 
this line of reasoning adopted by the Panel.182 
The Panel argument that a zero quota limitation was not included in XVI:2 
because it was not foreseen has received convincing critique. According to the 
Panel such types of limitations were not foreseen because Members wanting to 
keep zero quota would not have inscribed a commitment at all. However, as 
indicated by the Panel itself, a Member would need to inscribe a type of ser-
vice provision (for instance face-to-face delivery) in order to be allowed to 
prohibit that type which would require a zero quota type limitation.183 
Moreover, as argued by Krajewski, monopolies have been included as a 
form of market access restriction in article XVI:2. Following the same argumen-
tation, there is no reason why monopolies were foreseen as a market access 
restriction and included in the list while the restriction in the form of a zero quo-
ta was not. Why would a Member schedule a sector while maintaining a public 
monopoly?184 
                                         
180 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.332. 
181 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.331. 
182 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 234. 
183 Ortino 2006, p. 136, US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.287 and 6.331, upheld by the 
Appellate Body  US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 233-234. As indicated by 
Krajewski, the argument is not reflected in reality. There is little doubt that the US 
wanted to restrict online gambling while at the same time making a full commitment to 
market access, although Krajewski admits that this is possibly due to the fact that nego-
tiators did not foresee Internet supply of gambling services at the time of negotiating the 
specific commitment (1992/1993), Krajewski 2005, p. 434; Zleptnig 2008, p. 385. Note 
that the United States measures have been adopted years before the creation of the 
GATS. 
184 Krajewski 2005, p. 434. 
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By analysing the elements ‗numerical quotas‘ and ‗form‘ in article XVI:2(a), 
the Appellate Body concluded that the focus of the provision is on limitations 
relating to numbers. Ultimately the Appellate Body concluded that limitations in 
the form of a numerical quota ‗would encompass limitations which, even if not in 
themselves a number, have the characteristics of a number.  Because zero is 
quantitative in nature, it can, in our view, be deemed to have the ―characteris-
tics of‖ a number—that is, to be ―numerical‖.‘185 
The Appellate Body continued by concluding that the other elaborations in-
cluded in article XVI:2(a) suggest a similar conclusion, namely that limitations 
that in effect are monopolies or exclusive service suppliers should be included 
in the scope of the provision.186 Finally, the Appellate Body concluded that, as 
it was not clear that the limitation in the form of economic needs tests should 
take a particular form, the limitation suggested that ‗in the form of‘ should not 
be interpreted as prescribing rigid mechanical formula.187 
The Appellate Body observed that its argumentation should not be inter-
preted as replacing ‗in the form of‘ with ‗that have the effect of‘ in article 
XVI:2(a). Rather, the Appellate Body concluded that ‗it is clear that the thrust of 
sub-paragraph (a) is not on the form of limitations, but on their numerical, or 
quantitative, nature.‘188 Thus, measures caught are not those that have the effect 
of quantitative limitations but rather limitations that are quantitative in na-
ture.189 
In light of the above, in my opinion it may be presumed that the Appellate 
Body did not adopt an effect-based approach to article XVI:2.190 Much of the 
heavier critique and warnings issued in the literature should certainly be borne 
                                         
185 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 225-227. 
186 The Appellate Body compares the concept of monopoly with ‗monopoly supplier of a 
service‘ in article XXVIII(h) which includes suppliers of a service that are in effect mono-
poly suppliers. The concept of exclusive service supplier in article XVI:2(a) is compared 
with the definition of article VIII:5 where the concept exclusive service supplier applies to 
service suppliers that are in effect exclusive suppliers, US – Gambling Appellate Body 
Report, par. 228-129. 
187 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 231, see par. 240-247 for similar conclu-
sions regarding XVI:2(c). 
188 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 232. 
189 As summarized by Zleptnig 2008, p. 403. As the Appellate Body states: ‗measures 
equivalent to a zero quota fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a)‘ (emphasis added), US 
– Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 237, see par. 247 regarding sub (c). 
190 Similar, Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1067-1068. Zleptnig‘s summary of the Appellate Bodies 
reasoning indicates that the effect-based approach has not been adopted, ‗as such an 
approach would be inappropriate‘, Zleptnig 2008, p. 403. See also: Krajewski 2003, 
p. 84. 
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in mind, yet ultimately it seems that this particular conclusion of the Appellate 
Body does not warrant such critique. 
As certain ambiguities remained, both the Panel and Appellate Body used 
additional means of interpretation to support their arguments.191 Both institu-
tions relied on the Scheduling Guidelines 1993 which state that nationality re-
quirements should be seen as a zero quota. According to the Panel, the zero 
quota example in the Guidelines suggested that measures not expressed in the 
listed forms may still fall within the scope of article XVI:2(a).192 The Appellate 
Body was more explicit, simply stating that the example confirmed the conclu-
sion that a prohibition of a service should be seen as a zero quota.193 
An important difference between the Panel and Appellate Body‘s reason-
ing concerning the zero quota example is that the emphasis of the argument 
used by the Panel is to indicate that it is possible that forms not listed in article 
XVI:2 can still be captured by it. While the conclusion that a prohibition can be 
considered as a zero quota is logical, this is actually not the thrust of the argu-
ment made by the Panel. The Appellate Body appeared to consider a prohibi-
tion and a nationality requirement as two similar restrictions, to be regarded as 
a zero quota. As will be discussed below, both adjudicating bodies have been 
criticised for the Appellate Body‘s use of the example. In my opinion, however, 
the Panel‘s use of the argument deserved more attention.194 
At this point the following conclusions regarding the delineation of articles 
VI and XVI can be drawn. Although at first glance it seems that commentators 
and the Dispute Settlement Bodies are all deeply divided in their opinions, the 
general idea concerning the delineation of the two provisions is broadly 
shared.195 In my opinion the discussion mainly concerns the conclusion in Gam-
bling that measures completely restricting trade in services through a particular 
mode fall within the scope of article XVI. The feared extension of the scope of 
article XVI to the detriment of article VI does not follow from the Gambling 
case. 
                                         
191 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 236. 
192 Scheduling Guidelines 1993, par. 6, Scheduling Guidelines 2001, par. 12, US – Gam-
bling Panel Report, par. 6.332.  
193 US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 237. Krajewski notes that this argument 
could be further supported by the practice of many Members to schedule nationality re-
quirements, which could indicate that it has become practice accepted by other Mem-
bers, Krajewski 2003, p. 86. 
194 Especially when one adopts the position that only restricting all means of supply would 
amount to a restriction falling within the scope of article XVI. If article XVI indeed would 
include forms that in essence entail market access restrictions then this conclusion would 
lead to the Gambling measures being caught under XVI without adopting an effect-
based approach. 
195 See §3.2. 
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3.3 The relationship between XVI and XVII GATS 
Two similar problems can be discerned relating to the scope of the provisions 
on market access and national treatment. Due to an overlap in scope it is poss-
ible that inscribed commitments under these provisions can conflict. While article 
XVI and XVII alone can lead to this problem, the application of article VI can 
give rise to a similar conflict between inscribed commitments under article XVI 
and XVII. Both issues will be addressed in this paragraph. 
3.3.1 Overlap in scope of article XVI and XVII 
The provisions on market access and national treatment do not expressly estab-
lish criteria to distinguish between their scopes. Reading article XVII, which ap-
plies to ‗all measures affecting the supply of services‘, suggests that discrimina-
tory measures as listed in article XVI also fall within the scope of article XVII. 
This is confirmed by article XX:2 which provides: 
 
Measures inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII shall be inscribed in the 
column relating to Article XVI.  In this case the inscription will be considered 
to provide a condition or qualification to Article XVII as well. 
 
As article XX:2 indicates that inconsistency with both provisions is possible there 
must be an overlap in their scope.196 Unfortunately, this is where certainty ends 
and there is striking disagreement in the literature and among Members as to 
how articles XVI and XVII interrelate.197 
The measures in articles XVI and XVII that overlap are the discriminatory 
measures listed in article XVI:2. Two different readings can be discerned from 
the literature. Article XVI may be seen as applying to both discriminatory 
measures and non-discriminatory measures or only to discriminatory measures. 
Phrased differently, the question is whether the measures listed in article XVI 
cover foreign and domestic suppliers or only foreign suppliers. Most commenta-
                                         
196 Similar, Mattoo 1997, p. 113; Krajewski 2003, p. 114; Pauwelyn 2005, p. 148-150; 
Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1072-1073 and Mavroidis 2007, p. 9. See also, Scheduling 
Guidelines 2001, par. 8. See for a clear summary of the issue: WTO (CSC) 2003, par. 
2-4. 
197 See in particular: Krajewski 2005, Pauwelyn 2005, Delimatsis 2006a, Ortino 2006 and 
Mavroidis 2007. 
Note that these publications have all been written after, and in response to, the US – 
Gambling case which constitutes the first interpretation of these GATS provisions. An ear-
ly identification of possible problems relating to overlap between article XVI and XVII 
can be found in Mattoo 1997. Disagreement among Members is evident, see WTO 
(CSC) 2004, par. 4. The WTO document includes a summarising statement by the Chair-
man in the 4th paragraph and a range of opinions expressed by delegates. 
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tors assume that article XVI applies to both non-discriminatory and discrimina-
tory measures, yet the position that article XVI should be interpreted to apply 
only to discriminatory measures is argued as well. This part of the debate will 
be discussed below.198 
Without further clarification as to the scope of these provisions it is possible 
for scheduled commitments to contradict each other as measures may fall under 
both provisions.199An oft-cited example is a situation where a Member has 
scheduled unbound under market access and none under national treatment. 
Discriminatory measures listed in article XVI:2 fall under both provisions, thus it 
is uncertain whether the scheduled ‗none‘ or ‗unbound‘ prevails.200 The reverse 
position, ‗none‘ under XVI and ‗unbound‘ under XVII can cause similar prob-
lems.201 Partial commitments lead to similar uncertainties insofar as the sub-
stance overlaps. Thus a schedule containing a market access commitment with 
the exception of XVI:2(a) type measures causes uncertainty regarding all other 
discriminatory XVI:2 measures, when none has been inscribed under article XVII. 
                                         
198 Mattoo 1997, p. 109-110, and more recent Low & Mattoo 2000, p. 450-451; Krajews-
ki 2005, p. 430; Pauwelyn 2005, p. 148; Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1063; Ortino 2006, p. 
139-140; Zleptnig 2008, p. 392. Mavroidis adopts a fundamentally different approach 
to articles XVI and XVII as he states that article XVI only applies to discriminatory meas-
ures. His opinion avoids the problem related to the scope of article XVI and XVII here 
under discussion, Mavroidis 2007. It should be pointed out that Mavroidis shares and 
constructed this opinion together with Marchetti, see Marchetti & Mavroidis 2006. 
199 Note that the problem of overlap between articles XVI and XVII is different from the 
above described delineation problems between article VI and XVI/XVII. The problem 
here is not whether the measure can be seen as discriminatory or containing elements of 
the list in article XVI:2, as the discriminatory element should be easy to verify. This makes 
the delineation simple even though the list of article XVI clearly can lead to problems. 
The overlap problem between XVI and XVII only rises in relation to the schedules of 
commitments, and only when a Member‘s article XVI and XVII commitments are not simi-
lar. 
200 For example, Mattoo 1997, p. 113 and 118 and Krajewski 2005, p. 418-419. Kra-
jewski explicitly links the uncertainty to the ongoing negotiations. See also WTO (CTS) 
2002, par. 6. 
201 There is nothing providing certainty in the GATS as to which commitment applies, Deli-
matsis 2006a, p. 1073. Note that in the discussion on the overlap between these provi-
sions in the Committee on Specific Commitments the Hong Kong, China delegate submit-
ted that the reverse position is less problematic as article XX:2 states that measures in-
consistent with both market access and national treatment should be inscribed under 
market access. As there is a full commitment under market access it can be deduced that 
measures scheduled under national treatment are not inconsistent with both provisions 
and thus are only inconsistent with national treatment. Even the inscription unbound under 
national treatment would not lead to the possibility to limit market access, see WTO 
(CTS) 2002, par. 8. The delegate of Japan agreed with this reasoning, see par. 10. 
However, these arguments are opinions of delegates in discussions, not legal interpreta-
tions. 
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The drafters of the GATS foresaw these potential problems and attempted 
to include a technical bookkeeping provision to prevent duplication and confu-
sion. Article XX:2 provides the outcome of these deliberations.202 However, the 
discussion leading to article XX:2 did not consider the possibility of schedules 
containing contradictory inscriptions.203 Therefore, article XX:2 can be said to 
have added to the confusion.204 
Delimatsis summarizes several solutions explored in the literature and in 
discussions between Members within the Council for Trade in Services.205 A first 
option is to consider article XVI commitments to prevail over XVII commitments, 
article XVI then functions as lex specialis to article XVII. Some authors indicate 
that this option could be legally based on a reading of article XX:2 as that 
provision states that an inscription under XVI provides a qualification for XVII 
as well. However, others reject that solution as the text of article XVII clearly 
indicates that it applies to all measures.206 
                                         
202 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1073, referring to WTO (CTS) 2002, in particular par. 5-6 and 12 
in turn referring to a background note on the drafting history and scope of XX:2. 
203 WTO (CTS) 2002, par. 6. Note that the Scheduling Guidelines address the overlap be-
tween the two provisions in the scenario that no limitation is inscribed under XVII while the 
commitment under XVI still allows discriminatory measures. In that scenario article XX:2 
provides that the commitment under XVI also applies to XVII, thus the discriminatory 
measure can be maintained despite the inscription under XVII. However, this does not 
address the problem of schedules containing an ‗unbound‘ inscription under XVI and 
‗none‘ under XVII, Scheduling Guidelines 2001, par. 18, see also Mattoo 1997, p. 113 
fn 15. 
204 Mattoo 1997, p. 113. 
205 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1074-1075. Mattoo takes a different approach and considers the 
overlap problem from a mode 3 and 4 perspective only as he focuses on measures af-
fecting the ability to establish or enter a Member‘s territory to provide a service, and 
those that apply post-establishment, a distinction that relates to border measures and 
domestic regulation. In this approach mode 1 and 2 are less relevant. Using this ap-
proach Mattoo considers a solution to the overlap problem in which establishment and 
entry related measures would be excluded from the scope of the national treatment ob-
ligation, while measures applying post-entry would fall within the domain of national 
treatment, Mattoo 1997, p. 115-116 and more recent Low & Mattoo 2000, p. 451. 
206 While recognising the counter argument based on the fact that article XVII applies to all 
measures, Krajewski supports this solution. He considers article XX:2 to provide strong 
support for article XVI as lex specialis of article XVII. Krajewski considers article XX:2 of 
extra importance as it possibly was intended as more than just a scheduling rule and no 
other provisions concerning the relationship between article XVI and XVII are included in 
the GATS. Krajewski 2003, p. 115-116. Pauwelyn rejects the solution based on the same 
argument, article XVII applies to all measures. Moreover, he considers article XX:2 to re-
ject the lex specialis option. Article XX:2 states that measures scheduled under XVI can no 
longer violate article XVII. However, to state that measures included in XVI do not fall 
within the scope of article XVII and can therefore not violate the provision goes much fur-
ther. This would mean that even though a full commitment to national treatment was in-
scribed, no commitment undertaken under XVI would still allow discriminatory market 
→ 
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A second option is to consider article XVII commitments to prevail over ar-
ticle XVI commitments, a solution referred to as strong national treatment.207 
The second solution is supported by the fact that article XVII applies to all 
measures. However, this reading of national treatment cannot explain XVI:2 (e) 
and (f) which can only have a discriminatory form.208 
Two other options are to let unbound entries prevail over commitments un-
dertaken or vice versa. The first option would be consistent with the interna-
tional law principle of in dubio mitius, as in international law state sovereignty 
should not be considered restricted unless clear and unambiguous. The second 
scenario would protect other Member‘s expectations and favours the idea of 
progressive liberalization.209 
Finally, the matter could be left to each Member to decide and thus to in-
dicate in its schedule of commitments which inscription takes precedence.210 
In my opinion it is currently not possible to resolve the matter from the text 
alone. Not only are all possible solutions susceptible to equally valid counte-
rarguments, the actual solution adopted can lead to Members having a more 
liberal Schedule than intended. As commitments are negotiated on the basis of 
reciprocity choosing a solution for existing commitments is already problematic. 
Therefore, as is rightly stressed in the literature, it is all the more important that 
the matter is resolved before new commitments are undertaken.211 
                                         
access restrictions. Pauwelyn submits that it would be more logical to consider the com-
mitment not to discriminate as prevailing over the more general non-commitment on mar-
ket access, Pauwelyn, 2005, p. 150 fn 65. Note that Mattoo submits the possibility of the 
lex specialis option but does not explicitly take a stance on the issue, Mattoo 1997, p. 
116 and 118. Delimatsis considers the option to lack legal basis in the GATS, Delimatsis 
2006a, p. 1074. 
207 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1074, Similar: Mattoo 1997, p. 115-116. 
208 Mattoo 1997, p. 116, who only refers to sub (f); Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1074. 
209 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1074, Pauwelyn indicates that the commitment not to discriminate 
could prevail over the general non-commitment as lex specialis, Pauwelyn 2005, p. 151 
fn 65. 
210 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1074. 
211 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1073 and 1074-1075. Both Delimatsis and Mattoo link their solu-
tions to consequences for liberalization, Mattoo 1997, p. 119, Delimatsis 2006a, p. 
1074. Two vital issues can be distinguished, how to interpret existing commitments and 
clarifying the GATS before new commitments are inscribed. If all Members know exactly 
what the effect is of contradictory scheduled commitments they can negotiate according-
ly, opening their markets and requesting the opening of other Members markets. There-
fore, it would be better to resolve the matter before continuing negotiations as current 
requests and offers could be affected. The irony is that the actual choice only affects cur-
rent commitments. Whether one option leads to more or less liberalization does not mat-
ter, as long as Members are aware they will inscribe their wishes accordingly. 
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3.3.2 Article VI and conflicting commitments under article XVI and XVII 
A closely related problem of conflicting commitments under articles XVI and 
XVII is caused by article VI:4 and 5. Article VI aims at the reduction of trade 
distortion caused by non-discriminatory domestic regulations not covered by the 
six categories in article XVI:2.212 Therefore, at first glance, the interaction be-
tween article VI and XVII does not seem to lead to problematic results. Discri-
minatory domestic regulation should be dealt with under the national treatment 
obligation while non-discriminatory domestic regulation is dealt with under ar-
ticle VI. Nevertheless, conflicting commitments can again lead to difficulties 
when article XVI enters the equation. 
The relationship between paragraph VI:4 and 5 and XVII can cause prob-
lems in the situation where a Member has inscribed a market access commit-
ment but leaves national treatment unbound. The inscribed commitment under 
XVI triggers the application of article VI. As such, discriminatory qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements 
should fulfil the requirements in VI:4 and 5. Imagine a discriminatory licensing 
requirement which is not based on objective or transparent criteria and does 
not contain elements listed in XVI:2. The fact that the requirement is applied 
discriminatorily could ‗nullify or impair‘ the commitment under article XVI in a 
manner foreseen under article VI:4 and 5, yet the Member has specifically ex-
empted the discriminatory element by leaving the national treatment obligation 
unbound.213 
Note that only paragraphs 4 and 5 of article VI contain requirements that 
can lead to conflicts between commitments under article XVI and XVII. The obli-
                                         
212 Delimatsis 2006b, p. 18, see also US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.304; implicitly 
Feketekuty 2000, p. 101; Low & Mattoo 2000, p. 455; Nicolaïdis & Trachtman 2000, 
p. 257; Pauwelyn indicates that while article VI:4 refers to objective and transparent cri-
teria, it does not include a non-discrimination requirement, Pauwelyn 2005, p. 139 fn 29; 
implicitly Zleptnig, who indicates that: ‗domestic regulation covered by article VI is nor-
mally not protectionist or economically unjustifiable (in contrast to market access restric-
tions or discriminatory regulation)‘ (emphasis added), Zleptnig 2008, p. 398. 
213 For instance, a member introduces a qualification system containing a language require-
ment in the construction services sector after it has undertaken a full commitment on mar-
ket access. While the measure is not listed in article XVI:2 it is clear that the market 
access commitment is now useless for construction services suppliers from other Members 
if they cannot fulfil the language requirement needed to obtain a qualification. It is also 
clear that the measure does not comply with any of the requirements listed in article 
VI:4(a) and (b). 
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gation in article VI:1 does not refer to the substantive content of domestic regu-
lation, but only to their administration.214 
Regarding VI:3, it is possible that a measure or policy regulating the provi-
sion of information obligations is favourable to domestic services or service 
suppliers. This would violate article XVII but not VI:3 in itself, as long as the re-
sponse fulfils the time obligations. The same holds true for paragraph 6, as 
long as adequate procedures to verify the competence of professionals of oth-
er Members have been set up. If such procedures are discriminatory, this would 
violate article XVII, yet article VI:6 would not lead to problems so long as the 
procedure for foreigners remains adequate.215 
The solution to this specific problem should be similar to the solution chosen 
to deal with the conflicting commitments under articles XVI and XVII. Either the 
commitment inscribed under market access or national treatment should prevail, 
be it on the basis of the subject of the provision (strong market access or strong 
national treatment) or the nature of the commitment (unbound or none prevails 
over the other). Again, the solution adopted could lead to difficulties with exist-
ing commitments but the consequences for future negotiations are limited. As 
long as Members know which rule applies they can draft their requests and 
offers according to their wishes. 
3.4 The type of measures addressed by article XVI 
Mavroidis adopts a fundamentally different approach and argues that article 
XVI should be interpreted to address measures that only apply to foreign ser-
vices and service suppliers. Most commentators seem not to have explicitly ex-
amined this possibility, assuming after reading the text of article XVI and the 
Scheduling Guidelines that article XVI covers both non-discriminatory and dis-
criminatory quantitative restrictions. Delimatsis has explicitly rejected this read-
ing of article XVI.216 
According to Mavroidis‘ approach, article XVI is ‗nothing but a list of viola-
tions of article XVII.‘ The motivation that drove negotiators to include a specific 
list in article XVI, even though non-discrimination is already covered in article 
                                         
214 US – Gambling Panel Report, par. 6.432; Wunsch-Vincent 2006, p. 388; Delimatsis 
2006b, p. 19. As indicated above (see n 91), Delimatsis provides a description of the 
concepts of administration and general application, Delimatsis 2006b, p. 20-24. 
215 See regarding the requirement contained in paragraph 3, Delimatsis 2006b, p. 31-32 
and regarding paragraph 6, p. 47-48. 
216 Examples of the earlier are Mattoo 1997, Pauwelyn 2005 and Ortino 2006. As will be 
discussed below, Krajewski does not address the argument itself but explicitly accepts 
that article XVI goes beyond non-discrimination, see text at n 232. Delimatsis is explicitly 
aware of the interpretation of article XVI by Mavroidis and rejects it, Delimatsis 2006a, 
p. 1063 fn 22. 
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XVII, would be that the list contains ‗probably just the most frequent occurring 
violations of national treatment. Thus negotiators included them in article XVI to 
signal desire to abolish them.‘217 The consequence would be that when a mem-
ber ‗has not granted national treatment to foreign suppliers, it cannot impose 
on them any of the measures featured in article XVI GATS, unless it has indi-
cated so in its schedule of concessions.‘218 
The starting point of Mavroidis‘ argumentation is the rejection of the Sche-
duling Guidelines‘ interpretation of article XVI. In an interpretation of article 
XX:2, the Guidelines state that all measures falling under any of the categories 
in article XVI:2 must be scheduled, whether or not such measures are discrimina-
tory according to the national treatment standard of article XVII.219 
The rejection of the Scheduling Guidelines‘ interpretation is important. If in-
deed a textual interpretation of article XVI:2 leads to a different interpreta-
tion than the one used in the Scheduling Guidelines, the latter should be re-
jected as the Guidelines can only support a reading based on the text.220 
The next step in Mavroidis‘ argumentation is formed by a textual interpre-
tation of article XVI which indicates that the provision does not address non-
discriminatory measures.221 The main textual arguments are the inclusion of the 
phrase: ‗each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favourable‘ (emphasis added) in article XVI:1 and 
                                         
217 Recall Lang‘s statement (see n 79) that the list of market access restrictions included in 
article XVI:2 GATS is roughly analogous to the border measures traditionally applied in 
relation to trade in goods. Whether the listed measures were included to abolish the 
most frequent violations of national treatment or whether they are analogous to border 
measures does not change the argument forwarded by Mavroidis. It is equally viable to 
claim that the list was included to abolish the equivalent of border measures applying to 
trade in goods in the GATS, as border measures apply to foreigners. 
As will be discussed below, in my view, while the GATS reaches beyond border measures 
into the field of domestic regulation, that reach could be said to be embodied in article 
VI. Whether the move beyond negative integration is also incorporated in article XVI is 
not altogether clear, as that depends on the acceptance of the argument that the provi-
sion applies to non-discriminatory measures as well. 
218 Mavroidis 2007, p. 9. 
219 Mavroidis 2007, p. 6, Scheduling Guidelines 1993, par. 4. Note that Mavroidis refers to 
the Scheduling Guidelines 2001, par. 8. 
220 Mavroidis 2007, p. 7 fn 18. See regarding the legal status of the Scheduling Guidelines 
§1.4. Moreover, I suspect that several commentators and possibly the WTO adjudicating 
bodies have not seriously considered the possibility that article XVI only applies to dis-
criminatory measures after reading the Scheduling Guidelines. 
221 Normally an interpretation would begin by examining the text of article XVI. However, 
Mavroidis tries to convince readers to first drop the Guidelines‘ interpretation precisely 
because it should not be used if a textual interpretation provides a different outcome. 
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an investigation of the listed measures in article XVI:2 indicating that these limi-
tations only concern foreigners.222 
Looking into the rationale, or rather the lack thereof, behind the applica-
tion of the other listed market access restrictions in article XVI to domestic ser-
vice suppliers, Mavroidis argues that it becomes even more doubtful that the 
provision was intended to apply to both foreign and domestic suppliers. In my 
view, it can indeed be questioned why a regulator would want to limit total 
value of transactions, operations or assets of domestic providers.223 Similarly, 
why would a regulator limit the number of natural persons that may be em-
ployed or that a supplier may employ?224 The same reasoning can be applied 
to measures that restrict limitations on the number of service suppliers and the 
total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service output as 
listed in sub (a) and (c). Applying these measures to domestic suppliers would 
limit the growth of national companies.225 
Mavroidis raises several supporting arguments based on the Scheduling 
Guidelines, the nature and form of the GATS agreement, other GATS provi-
sions and policy arguments.226 
                                         
222 XVI:2(f) explicitly applies to limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of 
maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or 
aggregate foreign investment. Implicitly the same holds true for requirements of constitut-
ing a joint-venture as provided in XVI:2(e), Mavroidis 2007, p. 10. 
223 As provided in article XVI:2(b) GATS. An explanation offered by Mavroidis is the con-
centration of power. However, such motives are typically achieved through competition 
policies, Mavroidis 2007, p. 10 fn 26.  
224 As provided in article XVI:2(d) GATS. As Mavroidis points out, limitations of this type are 
typical for developed countries which have a high unemployment rate. It would be very 
odd to apply such regulations to domestic suppliers, Mavroidis 2007, p. 10 fn 27. 
225 Mavroidis 2007, p. 10. One possible explanation for the application of such measures to 
domestic service providers is that a regulator wants to control the supply of a service in a 
certain area, for instance the amount of dentists or pharmacies in certain areas. Control-
ling supply would normally take the form of limitations indicated in XVI:2(a). 
226 Examples of the type of measures listed in sub (b)-(e) of the Scheduling Guidelines only 
concern examples that are discriminatory, Scheduling Guidelines 2001, par. 12, see Ma-
vroidis 2007, p. 10 fn 28 and p. 13-14; the idea that article XVI regulates market 
access for domestic suppliers is contrary to the nature of the GATS. The Agreement in-
tends to liberalize trade in services, the purpose being to grant access for foreign sup-
pliers in markets they could not access before. Examining the situation of a country sche-
duling a commitment that applies also to domestic suppliers provides odd results, such as 
having to pay compensation to trading partners for damaged in part inflicted on its own 
domestic service providers, see article XXI on compensation, Mavroidis 2007, p. 10-11. 
The transfer of sovereignty should only be assumed based on clear and unambiguous 
transfers of power (in dubio mitius), Mavroidis 2007, p. 11. International trade agree-
ments internalize externalities stemming from the unilateral definition of trade and 
trade-related policies, they do not regulate the internal market itself, Mavroidis 2007, 
p. 11. The GATS is foremost a negative integration contract, where positive integration 
→ 
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The consequence of this approach would be that inscribing an article XVI:2 
commitment may be seen as a first step towards the adoption of national 
treatment, abolishing the worst forms of discriminatory measures.227 
Several arguments supporting the opposite reading, that article XVI ap-
plies to both non-discriminatory and discriminatory measures, have been put 
forward in the literature. 
Only one of the six listed market access restrictions explicitly applies exclu-
sively to restrictions and only addresses foreign services or service providers, 
article XVI:2(f), the text of the other five restrictions can also refer to domestic 
services or service providers. Nevertheless, this still begs the question as to the 
rationale of imposing these restrictions domestically.228 
While the Scheduling Guidelines cannot be used as a stand alone argu-
ment, they provide clear support to a reading that article XVI applies to non-
discriminatory measures as well.229 
Mavroidis argues that the GATS is a negative integration contract aimed 
at liberalizing trade in services and not aimed at opening or regulating domes-
tic services markets, except through article VI. Several authors argue the exact 
opposite. They claim that the GATS provisions do relate to domestic regulatory 
measures as a consequence of the type of barriers that restrict trade in servic-
es.230 Their argument indicates, or at least implies, that article XVI:2, just like 
article VI, is concerned with barriers to trade caused by domestic regulation.231 
                                         
does take place this should proceed through article VI:4, Mavroidis 2007, p. 11-12. 
Trade liberalization will be served by restricting the scope of XVI to measures that apply 
to foreign suppliers only. As indicated by Mattoo, the allocation of quotas in a manner 
consistent with non-discrimination can pose problems, Mattoo 2001, p. 23. Mavroidis 
submits that when article XVI only applies to foreigners the problem of a country libera-
lizing and allocating the extra quota to a domestic provider does not occur, as it can on-
ly be offered to foreign suppliers, Mavroidis 2007, p. 12. 
227 See for an overview of the consequences for scheduling commitments, Mavroidis 2007, 
p. 15-16. 
228 Article XVI:2(f) addresses limitations on foreign equity participation, see Pauwelyn 2005, 
p. 148-149. See also Krajewski who states that: ‗[m]ost of the measures mentioned in Ar-
ticle XVI:2 are typical market restrictions applied in a domestic regulatory context.‘, Kra-
jewski 2005, p. 430. Delimatsis provides the example that subparagraph (a) refers to 
the number of service suppliers and not only to the number of foreign service suppliers 
while subparagraph (f) expressly covers only foreign capital, Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1063 
fn 22. 
229 Scheduling Guidelines 1993, par. 4 and Scheduling Guidelines 2001, p. 8, Mavroidis 
2007, p. 7 fn 18. 
230 See §1.3 regarding the use of GATT provisions for analogous interpretation. 
231 Krajewski 2005, p. 430-431; as phrased by Delimatsis: ‗The GATS provision on market 
access extends beyond any conventional notion of access for foreign suppliers (tariff 
bindings in GATT) to embrace all policies (…) which restrict access to a market even in a 
→ 
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Krajewski explains that the application of article XVI to domestic regula-
tion can be said to reflect an intentional choice by the drafter to specifically 
liberalize domestic markets for foreign services and service suppliers when 
these markets are also closed to domestic suppliers.232 Thus article XVI extends 
beyond the conventional notion of access to markets.233 
The argument made by Mavroidis is worthy of examination. It is certainly 
true that the GATS has moved beyond the traditional notion of a trade agree-
ment and tries to deal with domestic regulation as well. As explained, within 
the GATT system a similar move is reflected by the SPS and TBT Agreements. 
While article VI GATS can roughly be seen as the counterpart of these agree-
                                         
non-discriminatory manner‘, Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1062; Wouters & Coppens 2008, 
p. 216-217; Zleptnig 2008, p. 392. 
232 This argument is advocated by Krajewski based in part on a reading of Trebilcock & 
Howse 1999, p. 279. However, I do not agree with Krajewski‘s conclusion drawn from 
that reference. According to Krajewski, Trebilcock & Howse indicate that the application 
of article XVI to non-discriminatory measures and the extension of the GATS into the do-
mestic regulatory context is the result of intense lobbying by large US service suppliers in 
the telecom, finance, logistics and transportations sectors. Moreover, the Reagan adminis-
tration believed that deregulation and privatization in domestic markets was required to 
meet market access demands. Krajewski adds that ‗this reflects the general spirit of the 
GATS as an agreement reaching beyond non discrimination and aiming at market access 
and reducing restrictive (domestic) regulations of services‘, and that this opinion is in line 
with the spirit of liberalization and deregulation of the 1980‘s, Krajewski 2005, p. 430-
431. 
However, Trebilcock & Howse only indicate that the US initially was interested ‗in nego-
tiating whatever changes in countries‘ domestic regulatory structures might be necessary 
to allow market access by foreigners‘. They continue by stating that it was: ‗far from 
clear to many Contracting Parties that the benefits of liberalization would outweigh the 
costs of substantially constraining or altering their domestic regulatory approaches‘. Af-
ter indicating that deregulation and privatization entail complex transitional issues and 
formidable challenges of regulatory redesign they state that: ‗It is not surprising, there-
fore, that even countries with short- or long-term intentions of liberalizing domestic com-
petition in key services sectors did not want their room to manoeuvre fundamentally con-
strained or pre-empted by a multilateral market access agreement.‘ Not only do Trebil-
cock & Howse indicate that the US position met with resistance from other countries, they 
also state that the US backtracked its original open borders rhetoric during the negotia-
tions, albeit not by rejecting their earlier stance on changes in domestic regulatory struc-
tures but through a non-MFN approach to certain topics. 
Note that Trebilcock & Howse, without indicating whether this approach was adopted in 
the GATS, state that extending the Agreement to liberalizing or changing domestic regu-
lation in order to facilitate market access would lead to profound implications for do-
mestic policy sovereignty and that ‗contrary to crude ‗free market‘ rhetoric, deregulation 
and privatization entail complex transitional issues and formidable challenges of regula-
tory redesign‘. See Trebilcock & Howse 1999, p. 279-280 and the most recent edition 
containing unchanged language Trebilcock & Howse 2005, p. 357-358. 
233 Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1062. 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2010/08 
 
 
63 
 
ments, if one wishes to argue against Mavroidis, one must read article XVI to 
reflect this  move beyond the traditional trade agreement as well.234 
Finally, as conceded by Mavroidis,235 both the Panel and the Appellate 
Body in the Gambling case implicitly accepted that article XVI covers measures 
of a non-discriminatory nature. Without expressly ruling on the matter, by ac-
cepting that non-discriminatory measures can infringe article XVI the adjudicat-
ing bodies left no doubt as to their position.236 
Whichever viewpoint one prefers, the text of article XVI is unsatisfying. Ei-
ther approach could have easily been expressed more clearly by the drafters 
of the provision.237 
                                         
234 Nicolaïdis & Trachtman compare article VI:5 with the SPS and TBT Agreements. While 
addressing a different issue, they make an interesting point: ‗[VI:5] might be viewed as a 
‗least common denominator,‘ insofar as the parties could agree not to nullify or impair 
concessions earnestly made, but could not agree on more pervasive, blanket restrictions 
on their national regulatory sovereignty. Thus article VI(5) is first and foremost merely a 
standstill obligation‘, Nicolaïdis & Trachtman 2000, p. 258-259. Thus, assuming that ar-
ticle XVI:2 applies to non-discriminatory measures as well would mean that Members did 
restrict their national regulatory sovereignty regarding the six listed measures. While it is 
true that this would only apply in committed sectors, thus allowing Members to choose 
whether they want to accept this restriction of regulatory sovereignty, the same is true 
regarding article VI:5 as that provision also applies only to committed sectors. 
Wouters & Coppens also indicate that the SPS and TBT Agreements often serve as a 
comparator for the GATS provisions on domestic regulations. This is particularly clear in: 
WTO (WPPS) 1996. They further indicate that the necessity test is a tool for liberaliza-
tion in WTO non-discrimination provisions such as article 2:2 TBT and 2:2 SPS. They ar-
gue that this reflects a shift from fair trade (prohibition of discrimination) to trade and as 
such reflects the influence of the neo-liberal political agenda of the 1980s referring to 
Krajewski 2003, p. 59. Note that the necessity test is a concept that might be introduced 
through article VI:4, again this signals that insofar as a shift from fair trade towards 
trade as such has taken place in the GATS, it specifically is connected to article VI and 
not XVI, see: Wouters & Coppens 2008, p. 210. It should be made very clear that this is 
my reading of the arguments used by Wouters & Coppens and not a restating of theirs. 
They clearly consider article XVI as an example of a provision that goes beyond discrim-
ination, Wouters & Coppens, p. 217 and fn 52. 
235 Mavroidis 2007, p. 2. 
236 Mavroidis 2007, p. 9. See regarding the non-discriminatory nature of the three US fed-
eral acts and the conclusions that these acts violate article XVI: Federal Wire Act, US – 
Gambling Panel Report par. 6.360 and 6.365, the Travel Act, US – Gambling Panel Re-
port, par. 6.366 and 6.373 and the Illegal Gambling Act, US – Gambling Panel Report, 
par. 6.374 and 6.380. The Appellate Body upheld these findings and therefore must 
implicitly have accepted the same position, that article XVI covers measures of a non-
discriminatory nature, US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, par. 265. 
237 Hence both Mavroidis and Delimatsis use the same argument albeit in support of oppo-
site viewpoints: namely, if the argument opposite to their own were true, why has this not 
been clarified in the text. Thus Mavroidis argues that article XVI:1 could have contained 
the term ‗domestic supplier‘ while Delimatsis wonders why only article XVI:2(f) contains 
→ 
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As indicated above, the Appellate Body in the Gambling case considered 
the Guidelines as supplementary means of interpretation within the meaning of 
article 32 VCLT.238 The Scheduling Guidelines therefore can be of decisive help 
but only if the GATS is silent on a particular issue.239 
As Mavroidis points out, having recourse to the text of the Guidelines is a 
matter of discretion of the WTO judge. If indeed article XVI should be read to 
cover discriminatory measures only then should the Scheduling Guidelines inter-
pretation not prevail over the legal text of the GATS itself.240 Depending on 
the correct reading of the GATS provisions, the Scheduling Guidelines either 
should be ignored, as it is contradicting the GATS itself or it confirms the read-
ing that article XVI applies to foreign and domestic measures. In my opinion, 
the discussion can therefore not be settled on the basis of the Scheduling 
Guidelines as they cannot settle conflicting textual interpretations. 
Several of the problems described above simply do not arise when article 
XVI is interpreted to cover discriminatory measures only. The overlap in scope 
between article XVI and XVII would no longer cause problems as scheduling 
article XVI would leave national treatment unbound except for the listed meas-
ures. Scheduling a national treatment commitment would apply to article XVI as 
well, as indicated in article XX:2. 
Similarly, a commitment under XVI while leaving XVII unbound would not 
lead to problems through article VI:4/5. The article XVI commitment clearly 
would prevail over the unbound inscribed under article XVII. Measures nullify-
ing or impairing the commitment under article XVI in a manner foreseen by ar-
ticle VI:4/5 should not be considered exempted by the fact that national 
treatment is unbound as that commitment does not apply to the discriminatory 
measures listed under article XVI.241 
The discriminatory measures only interpretation also solves the allocation of 
quotas problem indicated by Mattoo.242 When article XVI only applies to fo-
reigners the problem of a country liberalizing and allocating an extra quota to 
a domestic provider, thus practically negating the agreed commitment, does 
not occur. The extra quota can only be offered to foreign suppliers. 
                                         
the phrase ‗foreign‘ if the entire provision only applies to discriminatory measures, Ma-
vroidis 2007, p. 14, Delimatsis 2006a, p. 1063 fn 22. 
238 See §1.4. 
239 An example provided by Mavroidis is the meaning of the terms NONE and UNBOUND 
which are not defined in the GATS, Mavroidis 2007, p. 7 fn 18. 
240 Mavroidis 2007, p. 7 fn 18. Naturally, this argument does not alter the discussion itself, it 
merely claims that the text of the Scheduling Guidelines is not legally binding. 
241 See §3.3.2. 
242 See n 226. 
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However, a very practical point cannot be ignored. Whatever the original 
intention, Members, the Dispute Settlement Bodies and most commentators, have 
not questioned that article XVI applies to non-discriminatory measures as well. 
While the Scheduling Guidelines are not an authoritative legal interpretation 
of the GATS, most Members have in practice based their schedules of specific 
commitments on the Scheduling Guidelines.243 
In my opinion, it would be interesting to examine the position adopted by 
Mavroidis further. Most of the problems described in this paper would be 
solved and the interpretation can be supported by the text of the GATS. 
 
 
                                         
243 For the arguments see: §1.4. As earlier indicated (n 52), Regarding the schedules of 
commitments, Mattoo considers that if a scheduling practice by Members was based on a 
certain view then this gives an interpretation according to that view ‗a certain credence‘, 
Mattoo 1997, p. 110 fn 6, p. 115 and 117. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
After examining the GATS, WTO case-law, various notes and interpretation 
and the literature, several conclusions can be drawn. 
The relationship between articles VI and articles XVI/XVII can best be un-
derstood as complementary. Measures can consist of various elements, each 
potentially addressed by different GATS provisions. Therefore, each respective 
element of a measure can be dealt with under the relevant provision. However, 
the overlap between article VI:4/5 and articles XVI/XVII should be addressed 
in future disciplines as the matter can have significant consequences. If meas-
ures falling within the scope of article XVI and XVII are excluded from the ap-
plication of disciplines on domestic regulation then scheduled measures cannot 
be scrutinized according to the obligations specified under VI:4 and 5. If meas-
ures scheduled under XVI or XVII still have to comply with disciplines on domes-
tic regulation, a conflict could arise as the measure is scheduled under XVI or 
XVII while it can run afoul of the obligations contained in the disciplines. The 
current provisional application of these conditions under article VI:5 does not 
lead to problems as scheduled measures prevent the application of this provi-
sion due to the ‗reasonably expected‘ condition contained in VI:5(a)(ii) 
Although at first glance, it seems that the various commentators and the 
Dispute Settlement Bodies are deeply divided in their opinions, the general 
delineation of article VI and XVI is broadly shared. Article VI addresses quali-
fication requirements which can be overcome by an act of the supplier. Market 
access restrictions are quantitative in nature and cannot be overcome by the 
supplier. Measures imposing qualitative restrictions may have quantitative ef-
fects but that does not automatically turn them into market access restrictions. 
The discussion revolves around the conclusion in the Gambling case that 
measures completely restricting trade in services through a particular mode fall 
within the scope of article XVI. In my opinion, the feared extension of the scope 
of article XVI to the detriment of article VI does not follow from the Gambling 
case, however it is currently unclear how the Dispute Settlement Bodies would 
deal with cases that do not involve a complete ban but leave other options for 
supply. 
The problems relating to the overlap in scope of articles XVI and XVII and 
conflicting commitments cannot be solved solely by interpreting the text. As 
commitments are negotiated on the basis of reciprocity, choosing a solution for 
existing commitments is already problematic. Therefore, as is rightly stressed in 
the literature, it is all the more important that the matter is resolved before new 
commitments are undertaken. The same conclusion applies to the problem of 
overlap between these provisions and the application of article VI to prevent 
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nullification or impairment of commitments. The solution to this specific problem 
should be similar to the solution chosen to deal with the conflicting commitments 
under articles XVI and XVII. 
Finally, it is interesting to examine the possibility that article XVI applies 
only to discriminatory measures. Hopefully, this paper will stimulate the debate 
started by Mavroidis. The possibility of article XVI only applying to discrimina-
tory measures provides solutions for several of the problems addressed in this 
paper. However, until now case-law and most of the literature seem to have 
not considered the possibility at all, leading in practice to the application of 
article XVI to non-discriminatory measures as well. 
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